FOLLOWING THE LEADER OR FOLLOWING THE FOLLOWER:

SUBORDINATES AS INFLUENTIAL AGENTS

OF MANAGERS' BEHAVIORS

by

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STATEMENT OF DISSERTATION APPROVAL

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ABSTRACT

The prevailing perspective that leaders are the main agents of influence of followers' behavior is an overly simplistic and incomplete assessment of the interactions between leaders and followers. The present research attempts to "reverse the lens" and establish that subordinates can and do significantly influence managers' behaviors. Specifically, I focus on how the power of a subordinate influences a manager's self-interested behaviors. Additionally, I explore the perceived necessity of a leader as a context where a manager's behavior may be particularly susceptible to granting subordinates' requests. Results indicate that the salience of a high-power subordinate, as compared to a low-power subordinate, influences managers to engage in less self-interested behaviors and be more susceptible to granting subordinates' requests in an attempt to maintain their identity and influence as a leader. I examine this phenomenon through a series of seven experiments.

Dedicated to Melanie, Sophie, David, and any other future additions to the family. Without your inspiration, I would not have had the courage to start on this journey. Without your support, I would not have been able to survive this journey. Without your motivation, I would not have been able to complete this journey.

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CHAPTER 1

LITERATURE OVERVIEW

With a flourish of the conductor's baton, the orchestra sounds the final note of the symphony, and the audience rises in applause. The conductor turns to the audience, and with an exaggerated bow, accepts the audience's ovation. After a moment, the conductor extends an arm back toward the orchestra, inviting the audience to also recognize the contributions of the orchestra members, but which group is most responsible for the performance: the conductor or the orchestra? From the actions of conductors and the implicit acceptance of audiences, one may view the conductor as both the leader of the orchestra and as the representative entity that deserves the most credit for the performance. The vast majority of leadership research would also support the claim that a successful performance is contingent upon effective leadership (Avolio, Walumbwa, & Weber, 2009; Hackman & Wageman, 2004; Morgeson, DeRue, & Karam, 2009; Yukl, 2012).

No one pays to see a formally dressed individual wave a small piece of wood in the air for hours on end. The ability of the orchestra members to perform the symphony is the real reason the audience attends — although some credit for the performance must be given to the conductor. The conductor coaches, coordinates, and facilitates the execution of the symphony (Hackman, 2005), but is the conductor the force that drives the performance of the orchestra? How much of a successful performance should be accredited to the abilities

of the orchestra members? Could the ability of the orchestra actually be the force driving the actions of the conductor?

Overview of the Literature

Whereas the effectiveness of a leader's influence on followers' behaviors has been thoroughly examined (Avolio et al., 2009; Hogg, 2010), research into the ways in which followers influence their leaders' behavior remains a nascent and growing body of research (Shamir, 2007; Uhl-Bien, Riggio, Lowe, & Carsten, 2014). The present research responds to the call from Staw (2016) to explore the upward influence of subordinates on certain behaviors of their manager. Specifically, I will explore how the attributes of a subordinate can affect the behavior of their manager and contexts that can alter that effect. In other words, how might the characteristics of orchestra members affect the behaviors of their conductor, and are there certain contexts that strengthen or weaken that effect?

Followership is defined as the effect of followers on their leaders and how followers affect the process of leading others (Uhl-Bien et al., 2014). Because leadership involves influencing — the capacity to have an effect on another (Hogg, 2010) — others, followers (i.e., individuals to be influenced) are an essential component of leadership. Yet much leadership research solely focuses on leaders as the causal agents of influence and followers as agents influenced by their leaders (Yukl, 2012). In general, the leadership literature treats followers as either passive recipients or unintentional moderators of the influence of a leader (Bass, 2008) and has largely ignored the idea that whereas leaders may influence followers, followers must allow themselves to be influenced (Uhl-Bien & Pillai, 2007). This idea of the cocreation of leadership in the interactions between leaders and followers

(Fairhurst & Uhl-Bien, 2012) has led to a new stream of research that focuses on how *followers* serve as the agents of influence and *leaders* as agents influenced by their followers (Bligh, 2011; Carsten, Uhl-Bien, West, Patera, & McGregor, 2010; Shamir, 2007; Sy, 2010; Uhl-Bien et al., 2014). The core behaviors of leaders — creating, structuring, and coaching groups (Hackman & Wageman, 2004) — all rely on followers to grant their leader the influence needed to perform those core behaviors (DeRue & Ashford, 2010). In other words, our understanding of a manager's behavior is incomplete without also understanding the role subordinates play in shaping their manager's behaviors.

The identification of this "followership gap" in the leadership literature led Shamir (2007) to call for research to "reverse the lens" and focus on followers as the agents of influence and leaders as recipients or moderators of a follower's influence. Subsequent to Shamir's call, two theoretical views of followership have developed: the constructionist view and the role-based view.

Constructionist View of Followership

The constructionist view considers leadership and followership as cocreated social processes (Fairhurst & Grant, 2010). The constructionist view is leadership and followership are processes of repeated relational interactions and that the identities, relationships, and behaviors of both leaders and followers inform hierarchical roles (DeRue & Ashford, 2010). The central focus of constructionist followership research is exploring how relational interactions between individuals socially construct leadership and followership (Fairhurst & Uhl-Bien, 2012).

In the last decade, several authors have begun to expound on the constructionist view.

Collinson (2006) laid the groundwork for the constructionist view. He supported an identity-based view that individuals must be understood by exploring their social context (Layder, 1994). Based on this view of identity, Collinson (2006) argued that the identities of followers and leaders must also be explored in their shared social context. In other words, exploring leaders and followers as discrete entities only provides a limited understanding. By considering the social interactions between leaders and followers, we can better understand how followers and leaders shape each other's identities. Shortly thereafter, Shamir (2007) coined the term "co-production" to describe how leadership is jointly produced between leaders and followers. Shamir contends that leaders and followers share responsibility in the leadership process and asserts that leadership research needs to move away from a leader-centric approach and adopt a more balanced view of the importance of both leaders and followers.

DeRue and Ashford (2010) further developed the constructionist view by introducing the concepts of claiming and granting behaviors. Claiming behavior represents the act of an individual identifying as either a leader or a follower, and granting behavior represents the bestowal of a claimed identity from another individual. According to their theory, the process of both leadership and followership begins when one party makes a claim. A claim serves as a request to validate a role as either a leader or a follower. By granting a claim, the other party not only validates the initial party's role, but also can make an implicit claim on their own role.

For example, if Individual A makes a claim as a leader and Individual B grants that claim, Individual B is also claiming the role as a follower, which would subsequently need to be granted by Individual A. This process is rarely so explicit, but this example illustrates

that "leading" requires claiming and granting behaviors of both parties. DeRue and Ashford refute the common conception that formalized hierarchy defines a leader (i.e., an individual holding a formal role is a leader). The authors treat leadership and followership roles as flexible, dynamic, and potentially reciprocal and posit that leadership cannot be socially constructed without a follower granting leadership and taking on a follower role. In all, the constructionist view establishes leadership as a social construction and treats followers as key figures in understanding a leader's attitudes, behaviors, and identity.

Whereas the constructionist view of leaders' and followers' identities may be particularly beneficial in understanding emergent leadership (Avolio et al., 2009), the traditional organizational hierarchy — contrary to the constructionist view — often has limited flexibility and dynamism (Magee & Galinsky, 2008). Some hierarchical mobility is possible in organizations, but the level of dynamic hierarchical permeability suggested for the successful coproduction of leadership (DeRue & Ashford, 2010) may be too constrained within the hierarchical structure of most organizations. Therefore, even though the constructionist view informs the dynamic relationship of managers and subordinates, the role-based view of followership may be more beneficial to understanding leadership and followership within formal hierarchies in organizations.

Role-Based View of Followership

The role-based view considers how followership and leadership are enacted within the context of a social hierarchy (Carsten et al., 2010). This view focuses on how followers' attributes interact with leaders and how those interactions facilitate or hinder the outcomes of leaders, followers, and/or organizations (Carsten et al., 2010; Sy, 2010). The role-based

view broadly explores how a follower's characteristics and behaviors influence their leader's attitudes and behaviors. The role-based view develops upon early work performed by practitioners who identified the importance of followers and attempted to establish typologies of follower characteristics and traits (Chaleff, 1995; Howell & Mendez, 2008; Kelley, 1999; Lipman-Blumen, 2005; Zaleznik, 1965). These typologies all claim that followers have discrete ways in which they can and do choose to follow. Whereas each typology varies in what represents an effective follower (e.g., deferent [Taylor, 1947], active but subservient [Townsend & Gebhardt, 1998], actively engaged with the leader [Kelley, 1992], or serve as partners with the leader [Chaleff, 1995]), each typology contends that the way followers perceive their role will affect the way leaders can manage their followers and obtain organizational outcomes.

Carsten and colleagues (2010) were the first to empirically explore the role orientations of followers. Using qualitative methods, Carsten and colleagues identified specific role-based views held by followers and determined that the role-based views held by followers affect the way they interact and support their leaders. Depending on the role-based view of the follower, leaders must adjust and adapt their attitudes and behaviors, renegotiate organizational roles, risk eliciting suboptimal performance from their followers (Kohles, Bligh, & Carsten, 2013), and/or alienate their followers by violating their implicitly held beliefs about what it means to be an effective follower (Sy, 2010). Furthermore, the subsequent behavior of followers plays an active role in shaping a leader's behavior (Howell & Shamir, 2005).

Based on the role-based view of followership, Uhl-Bien and colleagues (2014) propose the following framework for the study of followership (see Figure 1). In their framework,



Figure 1. Partial model found in Uhl-Bien et al. (2014).

Uhl-Bien and colleagues propose that followership characteristics will affect followers' behaviors, and followership behaviors will interact with leaders' beliefs and/or behaviors. The present research will seek to amend this framework in order to explore a novel dimension of the role-based view of followership (see Figure 2). Specifically, I will propose that characteristics of subordinates will affect a manager's beliefs regarding their relationships with their subordinates and their subsequent behaviors. This contribution to the followership literature will further demonstrate ways in which followers can influence leaders' behaviors.

To investigate this model, I first explore the nature of power in organizational



Figure 2. Amended model of interest in the current research.

hierarchies and how formal roles in organizational hierarchies have certain normative expectations or prototypes that guide the acceptable behavior of those holding formal authority. Social identity theory is then explored as a mechanism that guides these prototypes. A relationship between formal leadership roles and a subordinate's power is posited in regards to a leader's self-interested and granting behaviors. A leader's perceived necessity is also posited in regards to a leader's self-interested and granting behaviors. Finally, the interaction between formal leadership roles and a leader's perceived necessity is posited in regards to a leader's self-interested and granting behaviors.

Followership in Organizations

Many decision makers within organizations believe there is a strong positive correlation between effective leaders and organizational performance (Avolio et al., 2009). The strong belief in this correlation has resulted in organizations giving increased power — in the form of both decision control and increased compensation — to individuals holding formal positions of authority (Hackman, 2005). Organizations often believe that the behaviors of a manager are positively correlated with organizational success, even if there is little substantive evidence of that positive correlation (Hackman & Wageman, 2007).Whereas organizations often overvalue the contributions of a manager, the significance of the contributions of subordinates are often overlooked (Shamir, 2007). The present research will explore the degree to which subordinates are responsible for some level of a managers' behavior and how the characteristics of subordinates can influence a manager's behavior.

Specifically, I look at the power of subordinates and how a subordinate's power may

affect a manager's self-interested behaviors. Furthermore, I also look at a common organizational context — when a leader is less necessary — that may magnify the effect subordinates may have on managers' behavior. In doing so, the hope is to alter how organizations view and value followers and encourage more inclusive academic conversation around leadership that incorporates both leaders and followers.

Power and Self-Interested Behavior

Power is defined as the asymmetrical control of resources (Magee & Galinsky, 2008), and self-interested behavior is defined as actions that benefit the self, irrespective of the common good (Miller, 1999). The relationship between power and self-interested behavior is both thoroughly researched and complicated. Two bodies of power research have developed in relation to self-interested behaviors (DeCelles, DeRue, Margolis, & Ceranic, 2012). Initially, power research focused on validating the popularized phrase that, "power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely" (Acton, 1907). Power has been shown to lead to corruption (Kipnis, 1972), a proclivity to denigrate others (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003), a heightened sensitivity to obtaining rewards (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003), a decreased sensitivity to threats, (Croizet & Claire, 1998), and overall behavioral disinhibition (Gruenfeld, Keltner, & Anderson, 2003). In sum, this body of research demonstrates that power generally leads to self-interested behaviors and a decreased sensitivity to others' needs or wants (Galinsky, Gilin, & Maddux, 2011).

The other body of power research links power with prosocial outcomes. Some examples of research demonstrating "positive" consequences of power include increased interpersonal sensitivity (Schmid Mast, Jonas, & Hall, 2009) and a proclivity towards

acting on ones' moral principles (DeCelles et al., 2012). Whereas these two bodies of research appear to run counter to one another, more recent work has suggested that pro-social behaviors may simply be strategic means of obtaining or maintaining power (Tost, Gino, & Larrick, 2013). The present research will address one way in which both selfish and prosocial behavioral consequences of power — specifically I introduce the willingness to accommodate the needs of others as a consequence of power — can be simultaneously present in formal leaders. There has also been some work in this area on the differential effects of power and other constructs (Blader & Chen, 2012), but due to the scope of the present research, I will solely focus on power.

Having formal authority (i.e., being made a manager) grants an individual some level of positional power (Keltner et al., 2003). When individuals gain power, they are inclined to make self-serving attributions (Kipnis, 1972). Power causes individuals to form simplistic impressions of those over whom they have power (Woike, 1994) and base their own behavior on self-serving expectancies (Copeland, 1994) and stereotypes (Fiske, 1993). Powerful individuals are less inclined to engage in perspective taking and, therefore, more likely to pursue behaviors that satisfy self-interest irrespective of the common good (Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, & Gruenfeld, 2006), but there is tension between the self-interested motives resulting from increased power and the sense of responsibility for those over which one has power (Tost, 2015).

Recently, organizations have placed increased emphasis on the importance of accountability and responsibility over others when exercising power (Hollander, 2012). Others researchers have argued that a power holder's ability to maintain power is grounded in their responsibility to maintain social expectations associated with power holders

(Biggart & Hamilton, 1984). One such social expectation is that power holders need to be viewed as acting in socially responsible ways by those they lead (Keltner, Van Kleef, Chen, & Kraus, 2008). In fact, Schilpzand, Hekman, and Mitchell (2014) found that enhanced power was a key factor in triggering individuals to have an increased sense of responsibility to act on the behalf of those over which they have power. This lends credence to the common military adage that the first rule of military leadership is to feed the troops first (Doerr, 1997; Harris, 1996).

To be effective and maintain their power, leaders must find a way to manage their self-interested desires within the bounds of the social expectations of power holders. Because leadership is a dynamic process of influence between at least two parties (DeRue & Ashford, 2010), individuals who obtain formal power can develop their social expectations based on their interactions with their subordinates (Hogg, 2001b). A leader's power often comes by way of a formal position (Keltner et al., 2003; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). Formal authority bestowed on a leader is laden with both social expectations and a psychological need to meet those expectations (Bettencourt & Sheldon, 2001; Biddle, 1986; Turner, 1990). One way in which those social expectations and needs are formed can be explained through social identity theory.

Leader Prototypes and Formal Authority

Social identity is formed through a system of social constructions that define where an individual "fits" in a given group or organization (Tajfel, 1972). Individuals use intragroup social comparisons to determine appropriate values, needs, and behaviors (Feldman, 1984; Secord, Israel, & Tajfel, 1975; Terry & Hogg, 1999). Individuals' social identities are

shaped by both social interactions (Turner, 1991) and normative cues (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). Within groups, formal roles (e.g., manager or employee) can serve as a normative cue for appropriate behavior (Zucker, 1977). When a manager receives formal authority, she engages in a process of self-categorization wherein the individual holding formal authority attempts to assimilate her self-identity with an embodiment of a representative leader prototype (Turner, 1985). This assimilation (depersonalization) is a fusion of how a manager perceives how she "would" act as an individual and how she "should" act as manager. Dissonance caused by depersonalization is typically resolved by adopting prototypical attitudes and engaging in prototypical behaviors (Hogg & Terry, 2000). In other words, if an individual is conflicted on how he should act as a manager, he typically engages in behaviors that are prototypical of his position in a group.

For instance, Harris (1996) discusses how the first lesson the British military teaches its lieutenants is that military officers always eat last. The premise is that military leaders have the power to eat first if they so desired but that eating first would violate the prototype that those in power have a primary responsibility to take care of the basic needs of those they lead. By feeding the troops first, leaders demonstrate their concern for the welfare of those they lead — thus establishing or reinforcing their behavior as prototypical of an effective leader (Doerr, 1997). This does not necessarily override or even attenuate the self-interested motives of a leader. Instead, this illustrates an example where the actions and/or motives of a leader can be both prosocial and self-interested in nature.

In groups, individuals attempt to embody relevant prototypes for two reasons. First, individuals have a desire for some level of positive self-worth (Turner, 1982), and the

capacity to which they fill their social roles can affect their evaluations of self-worth (Abrams & Hogg, 1988). Prototypes serve as a standard of self-evaluation by which individuals can determine how successfully they fill their roles in a group or organization (Hogg, 2001a). As individuals conform more closely to prototypical behaviors, they evaluate themselves more positively (Turner, 1991). Second, individuals generally want to be seen positively by others (Hogg, 1992). This desire to be seen positively by others is particularly strong in reference to in-group members (Hogg, 1993). As individuals conform more closely to prototypical behaviors, others generally evaluate conforming individuals more positively (Hogg, 2001a).

Particular to leaders' prototypes, leadership involves influencing others (Hogg, 2010). A leader's influence requires both a leader who claims the authority to influence a follower, and a follower who will grant influence to a leader (DeRue & Ashford, 2010). The desire to be perceived as prototypical has been suggested to instill leaders with a sense of responsibility for their followers well-being that supersedes the sense of entitlement received from the bestowal of formal power (Tost, 2015). By engaging in prototypical leaders' behaviors in an organization, managers can legitimize their formal authority with their subordinates (Epitropaki & Martin, 2004; Gioia & Sims, 1985; Tyler, 2006), and managers perceived as prototypical are more likely to receive compliance from their subordinates (Berscheid & Reis, 1998).

Social Identity Theory, Formal Authority, and Self-Interested Behavior

Each member of a group has both a discrete prototype of how a follower should behave (Kohles et al., 2013) and a discrete prototype of how a leader should behave (Hogg, 2001a).

As prototypes associated with organizational roles are made salient, subordinates evaluate managers based on the subordinates' prototypes of how a manager should behave (Sy, 2010). Because prototypical leaders have their ideas accepted more readily, have higher perceived status, and are more likely to be granted influence by their followers (Hogg, 2001a), managers should be motivated to be seen as prototypical to more effectively influence their subordinates (Haslam, Oakes, Turner, & McGarty, 1995). Leaders also have their own prototypes of how a leader should behave (Lord, Foti, & De Vader, 1984). A manager's expectations of how managers should behave evolves dynamically through interactions with their subordinates in an organization (Shamir, 2007), and one way that managers can evaluate the prototypicality of their behavior is through the responses of their in-group (e.g., subordinates; Hogg & Terry, 2000). In other words, managers use their interactions with subordinates to understand if their behaviors are representative of a prototypical managerial behavior; managers who are perceived as behaving more prototypically are generally more enduring and influential with their subordinates (Hogg, 2001a).

Taxonomies of leaders' prototypes (Lord et al., 1984; Nye & Forsyth, 1991) and behaviors (Hackman & Wageman, 2007; Morgeson et al., 2009) have established a range of actions in which prototypical leaders should engage to be perceived as effective leaders. One common thread among the literature regarding effective leaders' actions is that a leader's actions should serve the common good of the group. Subordinates consent to give managers some control over resources and decision making with the assumption that managers will use that power to enhance group outcomes (Van Vugt, Hogan, & Kaiser, 2008). Managers who are perceived as pursuing their own self-interest at the expense of

group outcomes (i.e., nonprototypical leader behavior) will lose some or all influence over their subordinates (Maner & Mead, 2010). While power may lead individuals to become narcissistic (Mead, Baumeister, & Vohs, 2009), entitled (De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2005), disinhibited (Galinsky et al., 2003), and self-anchored (Overbeck & Park, 2001), managers must maintain some prototypical behaviors that persuade subordinates that their leadership is beneficial to the group or organization and not solely self-serving (Hackman & Wageman, 2007; Nye & Forsyth, 1991). Therefore, I predict that the salience of a subordinate will make leader prototypes more salient to a manager and that managers with subordinates salient will attempt to embody a prototypical leader by engaging in less self-interested behavior. Based on this rationale, I make the following hypothesis:

H1a — There is an decrease in the self-interested behavior of a manager when a subordinate is salient as compared to when no one is salient.

Social Norms Versus Social Identity

Social normative pressure and/or the mere presence effect could be plausible alternative explanations as to why the salience of a subordinate might influence managers to engage in less self-interested behavior. Social norms are informal rules that govern and regulate behavior (Cialdini & Trost, 1998). Social norms establish socially acceptable behavioral expectations at either the group (Pepitone, 1976) or individual (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Sherif, 1936) level. Violations of norms can damage the normative violator's standing in an organization (Feldman, 1984) and potentially lead to social ostracism (Triandis, 1994). Self-interested behaviors — actions that benefit the self, irrespective of the common good — are generally perceived as nonnormative (Batson, Ahmad, & Tsang, 2002). In fact, some

scholars credit social norms as the mechanism that attenuates self-interested behavior and reinforces the pursuit of social and/or collective needs (Campbell, 1965; Triandis, 1994).

Even though power insulates individuals from normative pressure to a degree (Galinsky et al., 2011; Kipnis, 1976), individuals are less likely to engage in self-interested behavior when being monitored by another party because normative expectations are more salient (Campbell, 1975; Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975). Furthermore, the social facilitation literature has thoroughly demonstrated that the mere presence of another person can cause individuals to be more aware of others, be more emotionally aroused, alter behavior, and alter task performance (Bond & Titus, 1983; Guerin, 1986, 2010; Zajonc, 1965; Zajonc, Heingartner, & Herman, 1969). Whereas the salience of any individual (e.g., colleagues or subordinates) may place some level of normative or performance pressure on an individual holding formal authority, managers should be uniquely affected by the salience of a subordinate.

In additional to general social normative pressure, the salience of a subordinate can also present a social identity threat to managers. Social identity threat is the idea that a social identity may be at risk of devaluation in a given context (Steele, Spencer, & Aronson, 2002). Whereas managers may lose some general social standing by engaging in self-interested (nonnormative) behavior when a nonsubordinate is salient (Campbell, 1975), engaging in self-interested behavior, when a subordinate is salient, should result in both the loss of general social standing *and* potentially put their identity as a leader in jeopardy (Steele et al., 2002). Because a leader's power and influence are dependent on their followers (Uhl-Bien & Pillai, 2007), engaging in self-interested behavior could violate a subordinate's views of the prototypicality of a manager as a leader and threaten the

manager's power and influence in an organization (Hogg, 2001b).

Based on this logic, I predict that managers will exhibit less self-interested behavior when a subordinate is salient than when any other individual (e.g., a colleague) is salient because a subordinate's evaluation of a manager has greater potential consequences in terms of a manager's identity and ability to effectively influence their subordinates. Based on this rationale, I make the following hypothesis:

H1b — There is an decrease in the self-interested behavior of a manager when a subordinate is salient as compared to when a colleague is salient.

Formal Authority, Subordinate's Power, and Self-Interested Behavior

Whereas the effects of role orientations (Carsten et al., 2010; Howell & Shamir, 2005; Kohles, Bligh, & Carsten, 2012), implicitly held beliefs (Sy, 2010), and follower behaviors (Carsten et al., 2010;) have been shown to affect leaders' attitudes and behaviors, research has yet to explore other followers' characteristics that may shape leaders' attitudes and behaviors. The present research explores an as yet unexplored characteristic of followers — subordinates' power — and the effect a subordinate's power has on the behaviors of a manager. In the leadership literature, increasing a leader's power has been shown to affect the ways leaders and followers interact (Antonakis & Atwater, 2002). Formal authority affects the way followers and leaders perceive their power (Bogardus, 1927). Formal authority generally gives leaders more power through increased access and control over group resources (Magee & Galinsky, 2008) and more voice in decision-making processes (Aghion & Tirole, 1997). In leaders, increased power is linked to the devaluation of followers' views and opinions (Kipnis, 1976), an increased perception of dissimilarity with

followers (Magee & Smith, 2013), and an asymmetric perceived social distance with followers (Inesi, Gruenfeld, & Galinsky, 2012; Lammers, Stoker, & Stapel, 2009; Smith & Trope, 2006). The consequences of power on leaders' perceptions of their followers have two implications on leaders' behaviors.

First, individuals use assessments of power to evaluate how much attention to give to each member of a group (Fiske, 1993). As the relative power of high-power individuals (e.g., leaders) increases, high-power individuals show a decreased motivation to affiliate with or attend to the needs of others (e.g., followers; Copeland, 1994). Instead, high power individuals affiliate with and attend to the needs of those who are closer or equal to themselves in regards to power (Van Kleef et al., 2008). In extreme cases, high power can cause individuals to evaluate those with less power as having nothing of interest to offer to those with power (Zander, Cohen, & Stotland, 1959). Additionally, high-power individuals often make efforts to behave in ways that distance themselves from the influence of those low in power because of a perceived lack of instrumental value (Earle, Giuliano, & Archer, 1983; Inesi et al., 2012; Slobin, Miller, & Porter, 1968).

Second, increased power can influence how high-power individuals perceive their interactions with low-power individuals. High power can cause individuals to perceive themselves as dissimilar to those with less power (Ledgerwood & Chaiken, 2007; Magee & Smith, 2013). These perceived dissimilarities can lead to a decreased need to resolve any self–other discrepancies with low-power individuals (Sinclair & Dowdy, 2005). High-power individuals also tend to disengage from low-power individuals (Magee & Smith, 2013) and give low-power individuals' views and opinions less consideration (Antonakis & Atwater, 2002).

Whereas there is plentiful research that explores how altering the power of a leader affects a leader's behavior, little research explores how altering the power of a subordinate affects a leader's behavior. Because nonprototypical (e.g., self-interested) leaders are generally negatively evaluated by followers (Maner & Mead, 2010), managers should avoid explicit self-interested behavior because the self-interested behavior of a manager would most likely result in a self–other discrepancy between managers and subordinates (Davis & Rusbult, 2001). High-power individuals are more sensitive to the self–other discrepancies involving other high-power individuals (Magee & Smith, 2013). The more similarly two individuals assess their power in a group (i.e., managers and subordinates with higher power), the greater the social threat that a subordinate may pose to a manager (Mead & Maner, 2012). By definition, high-power subordinates will be group members that have a greater control over resources (e.g., knowledge, access to resources, network, etc.), but they are still subject to the formal power of their manager (Magee & Galinsky, 2008). Thus, the power of the manager stays constant, but the manager's perceptions of his or her own power may be altered—even though the power of the manager and the power of the subordinate are technically orthogonal.

A manager's and a subordinate's power are technically orthogonal because as a manager's or a subordinates power changes, the other individual's power is not necessarily altered. For example, if a manager receives a raise or new responsibilities (two examples of increased power), the power of their subordinate could remain constant. Additionally, if a subordinate receives a raise or new responsibilities, the power of their manager could also remain constant. The reason I posit that they are "technically" orthogonal is because even though the power of one does not inherently affect the other, the perception of their

power relative to one another could change.

Managers should perceive higher power subordinates as more similar to themselves (Antonakis & Atwater, 2002) and more integral to a groups' performance (Zander et al., 1959). Managers should care more about maintaining a prototypical image with high-power subordinates because managers should perceive a greater degree of dependence on high-power subordinates (Copeland, 1994; Van Kleef et al., 2008), and wish to preserve their influence over valued members of a group (Zander et al., 1959). I predict that managers will exhibit less self-interested behavior when a high-power subordinate is salient because managers will perceive that high-power subordinates are less dependent than lower-power subordinates. This reduction in perceived dependency between subordinates and managers will motivate managers to avoid self-interested behavior because acting out of self-interest in front of high-power subordinates would violate a subordinate's prototype of a manager and potentially compromise their influence over that highly valued subordinate. Based on this rationale, I make the following hypothesis:

> *H2 — There is a negative relationship between the power of a subordinate and the self-interested behavior of a manager.*

Formal Authority, Subordinate's Power, and Granting Behavior

Beyond a manager's desire to preserve their influence when a high-power subordinate is salient, a manager may also be more susceptible to granting requests to a high-power subordinate. I use DeRue and Ashford's (2010) definition of granting behavior as the bestowal of a claim tied to the identity of another (e.g., a follower choosing to follow a leader). As the power of a subordinate increases, a leader must expend more effort to

maintain influence over that follower (Katz & Kahn, 1978; Shamir, 1995). When subordinates have higher power, leaders engage in more helping behaviors to maintain their influence over their subordinates (Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, Luce, & Neuberg, 1997; Korchmaros & Kenny, 2006). Leaders may even accommodate those perceived as similar in power even if the requests are ethically questionable or unfair (Gino & Galinsky, 2012). I predict that managers will be more inclined to grant requests from high-power subordinates. These subordinates will have increased influence because managers both value and want to maintain their influence over high-power subordinates. Based on this rationale, I make the following hypothesis:

H3 — There is a positive relationship between the power of a subordinate and the granting behavior of a manager.

Necessity of a Leader: Substitutes for Leadership and Leaders' Self-Efficacy

Whereas most contemporary models of leadership recognize that certain leadership styles are inappropriate or unnecessary in specific contexts (Hackman & Wageman, 2007), most still maintain the assumption that situations will always benefit from a leader so long as the leader engages in "appropriate leader behaviors" (Avolio et al., 2009; Meindl, Ehrlich, & Dukerich, 1985; Morgeson et al., 2009; Yukl, 2012). This assumption about the inherent benefit of having a leader ignores instances where the leader is unnecessary or irrelevant. In other words, organizations often put managers in a position where they are expected to "lead," even when their efforts to "lead" may hinder the performance of their subordinates. To define necessary leadership, I will be combining concepts from two

existing bodies of research: leader's self-efficacy and substitutes for leadership as perceived by the leader. This is not to say that these two constructs (and leader's necessity) can only exist as perceptions of a leader, but for purposes of this paper, I am only exploring a leader's perception of substitutes for leadership and leader self-efficacy. Each body of research provides an integral component that informs how necessary leadership will be defined and subsequently operationalized in the present research.

Substitutes for Leadership

Path-goal theory was one of the first leadership theories to show that leaders' actions may be redundant in certain situations (House, 1971). Specifically, when both the goals of a group and the path to those goals are clear, a leader's attempts to clarify goals or paths can be perceived as unnecessary by followers (House & Mitchell, 1974). But path-goal theory only posits that redundant leadership will lead to dissatisfaction among subordinates and stops short of linking redundant leadership to negative performance outcomes of subordinates (Evans, 1996; House, 1996; House & Mitchell, 1974; Schriesheim & Von Glinow, 1977). The consideration-initiating structure literature takes the implications of redundant leadership one step further. The consideration-initiating structure literature posits that if subordinates perceive a leader as redundant, subordinate satisfaction, motivation, performance, and acceptance of the leader should all decrease (House & Dessler, 1974; Kerr, Schriesheim, Murphy, & Stogdill, 1974). However, neither path-goal theory nor the consideration-initiating structure literatures hypothesize situations where leadership is irrelevant or unnecessary.

In the mid-1970s, some leadership scholars began exploring contexts where leadership

can be neutralized. Taxonomies of nonleader substitutes for leadership (Miner, 1975) and reviews pointing out when leaders provide value to groups (Hunt, Osborn, & Larson, 1975; Kerr et al., 1974) resulted in a body of research that explores external substitutes for leadership. Substitutes for leadership are defined as organizational factors that affect a leader's behaviors and ability to lead (Kerr & Jermier, 1978). Three domains of substitutes for a leader have been identified: characteristics of subordinates (e.g., ability, knowledge, or dispositional traits), characteristics of the task (e.g., simplicity, variability, or intrinsically satisfying), and characteristics of the organization (e.g., flexibility, cohesiveness, or formalization; Kerr & Jermier, 1978). Kerr and Jermier (1978) posit that if one or more of these substitutes are salient, a leader's influence can be neutralized. For instance, when a task is too simple or easy (i.e., characteristics of the task), the task itself is a substitute for leadership. In other words, if a task is too simple, there should be little need for a leader and the simplicity of the task should neutralize any attempts to lead. Furthermore, the authors state that, in contexts where substitutes for leadership are salient to a leader, attempts to lead may be perceived by subordinates as unnecessary or hurt organizational outcomes.

The findings from the substitutes for leadership literature led to a small movement that briefly challenged the over-romanticism of leaders in organizations (Meindl et al., 1985). Whereas Meindl and colleagues (1985) started a conversation about the pitfalls of the leadership literature's tendency to over-romanticize conceptions of leaders, one could make the argument that the leadership literature in general has come full circle and has again become overly romanticized (Avolio et al., 2009; Hackman & Wageman, 2004, 2007; Morgeson et al., 2009). The limited research that has continued to explore external

substitutes for leadership has involved both instances where the substitutes work in tandem with leaders to enhance group outcomes (Xu, Wu, & Cavusgil, 2013) and instances where the substitutes render leadership irrelevant (Podsakoff, Niehoff, MacKenzie, & Williams, 1993). This duality raises the question - does a perceived substitute for a leader render a leader unnecessary? I argue that the salience of substitutes for a leader is not sufficient to determine the self-perceived necessity of a leader, but that a leader's self-efficacy must also be assessed.

Leaders' Self-Efficacy

Wood and Bandura (1989) define self-efficacy as an individual's beliefs in their ability to engage the motivation, cognitive resources, and actions needed to meet the demands of a situation. Leader's self-efficacy is a particular form of self-efficacy that applies to one's self-assessment of skills, knowledge, and abilities that are necessary to lead others in an organization (Hannah, Avolio, Luthans, & Harms, 2008). There is a wide body of literature regarding leader's self-efficacy, both in regards to theory development (Gist, 1989; Hannah et al., 2008; Hollenbeck & Hall, 2004; Kirkpatrick & Locke, 1996; Luthans & Peterson, 2002; Popper, Amit, Gal, Mishkal-Sinai, & Lisak, 2004; Rafferty & Griffin, 2006) and empirical studies (Chemers, Watson, & May, 2000; Finn, Mason, & Bradley, 2007; Hannah, 2006; Hendricks & Payne, 2007; Paglis & Green, 2002; Semadar, Robins, & Ferris, 2006; Taggar & Seijts, 2003). Leaders with high leader self-efficacy have been shown to have an increased motivation to influence others (Chan & Drasgow, 2001; Hendricks & Payne, 2007), an increased desire to assume formal positions of authority (McCormick, Tanguma, & López-Forment, 2002), and higher external performance ratings

(Robertson & Sadri, 1993; Semadar et al., 2006). Leaders with low leader self-efficacy show an increased vulnerability to external pressures (Bandura & Locke, 2003), less confidence in their decisions (Howell & Shamir, 2005), and a decreased internal locus of control (Paglis & Green, 2002). Managers who perceive themselves as having the necessary skills, knowledge, and ability to be a manager (i.e., high leader self-efficacy) should demonstrate more confidence in their decisions and more security in their position as a manager. Managers who perceive themselves as lacking the necessary skills, knowledge, and ability to be a manager (i.e., low leader self-efficacy) should demonstrate increased insecurity about their position as a manager and show more concern for external assessments (e.g., subordinates). Similar to substitutes for leadership, leader's self-efficacy begs the questions — what if a manager lacks self-efficacy but no leader substitutes are perceived? Additionally, what if a manager has high self-efficacy but many alternatives to the manager are salient?

Necessity of a Leader

Bandura (1997) suggests that self-efficacy, in general, should be explored within task and contextual bounds. In the domain of leader's self-efficacy, the vast majority of research explores generalized leader's self-efficacy and ignores the task and contextual bounds advocated by Bandura (Hannah et al., 2008). Theory in regards to substitutes for leadership is similarly limited. The substitute for leadership literature has focused exclusively on external alternatives to a leader and has largely ignored a leader's — perceived or actual — knowledge, skills, and abilities (Kerr & Jermier, 1978; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & Bommer, 1996a, 1996b). Managers retain their formal authority regardless of whether or

not they are needed for a given task. Most research explores leadership under the assumption that a leader is needed in some way even though it is intuitive that managerial intervention would not be needed, or might even be detrimental, in certain tasks. To better understand the effects of a leader's self-perceived necessity, I must first understand how a leader's necessity is determined.

To determine a leader's necessity — defined as the need of a leader in a given context — I argue that both a leader's self-efficacy *and* any perceived substitutes for leadership must be assessed. Leaders' necessity is not necessarily a new construct, but a combination of two existing constructs that represent the two vital dimensions in determining the need for a leader. If a manager has only leader's self-efficacy *or* lacks perceived substitutes for their leadership, the determination of a manager's necessity and subsequent group outcomes could be positive (Xu et al., 2013) or negative. For example, if a manager has high self-efficacy but external substitutes for leadership are salient, the confidence and security gained from high leader's self-efficacy could enable a manager to capitalize on the substitutes while maintaining their identity as a leader. Alternately, if a manager has low self-efficacy and no substitutes for leadership are salient, the vulnerability and lack of confidence resulting from low leader self-efficacy could be mitigated by the need for a leader and the lack of viable alternatives.

However, if a manager has high leader self-efficacy and no substitutes for leadership are salient to the manager (i.e., a necessary leader), the confidence and security gained from high leader self-efficacy may be reinforced by the lack of viable leader alternatives. Alternately, if a manager has low leader self-efficacy and external substitutes for leadership are salient to the manager (i.e., an unnecessary leader), the vulnerability and lack of

confidence resulting from low leader self-efficacy should be magnified by the salience of alternatives that threaten the leader's identity and organizational role. In summary, both external substitutes for leadership and a leader's self-efficacy should be needed to determine the self-perceived necessity of a manager's organizational role.

Necessity of a Leader and Self-Interested Behavior

Even when perceived as unnecessary, a manager still has the power associated with his or her formal position in an organization (Magee & Galinsky, 2008). The necessity of a leader either reinforces or attenuates the justifiability of the formal authority granted to a manager (Hannah et al., 2008; Podsakoff et al., 1996a). Because self-interested behavior is generally perceived as nonprototypical of an effective leader (Maner & Mead, 2010; Morgeson et al., 2009), engaging in self-interested behavior could threaten a manager's identity as a leader and threaten their influence in a group by violating subordinates' perceptions of necessary managerial behavior. In general, identity threats cause individuals to defensively protect their identity and engage in behaviors that preserve their role in an organization (Fast & Chen, 2009). Necessity can serve as a source of legitimacy (Epitropaki & Martin, 2004; Gioia & Sims, 1985) and either insulate or increase sensitivity and perceived vulnerability to identity threats (Bandura & Locke, 2003; Kerr & Jermier, 1978). I predict that when a manager is self-perceived as necessary, that manager will be more motivated to engage in self-interested behavior because there will be a decrease in the perceived threat to the manager's organizational role and identity as a leader. Furthermore, I predict that when a manager is self-perceived as unnecessary, that manager will be less likely to engage in self-interested behavior because there will be an increase in

the perceived threat to the manager's identity as a leader and an increase in the motivation to be perceived as a prototypical manager to maintain their influence in a group or organization. Based on this rationale, I make the following hypothesis:

> *H4 — There is a positive relationship between a manager's self-perceived necessity and the self-interested behavior of a manager*.

Necessity of a Leader and Granting Behaviors

Subordinates have an inherent expectation for some level of dependency on their managers (Magee & Galinsky, 2008), and subordinates also expect to make requests of their managers (Emerson, 1962). Prototypical managers are expected to serve as a form of gatekeeper who arbitrates access to their own expanded pool of group resources (Hackman, 1987; Shea & Guzzo, 1987). A subordinate can make a claim by making a request of their manager. A manager must determine if they will grant or deny the request of their follower. If a subordinate's request (a form of a claim) is granted, the roles of the manager and the subordinate are both reinforced. If a subordinate's request (claim) is denied, the roles of the manager and the subordinate could be mutually compromised depending on the strength of their respective role identifications because of a potential perceived violation of normative expectations (DeRue & Ashford, 2010).

Managers self-perceived as unnecessary are likely to feel threatened by the perception that they are unable to fulfill the role expectations of a leader (Cho & Fast, 2012; Fast & Chen, 2009). This role threat can stem from the fear of being assessed by others (e.g., subordinates) and found lacking the competencies expected of one holding a formal position of authority (Fast, Burris, & Bartel, 2014). When an individual's social identity is

threatened, they either seek to rationally justify their identity or engage in behaviors that protect and justify their social identity (Steele et al., 2002). In regards to granting behaviors, managers may find themselves in a position where a subordinate makes a request or engages in behaviors that serve the subordinate irrespective of the common good (Hoogervorst, De Cremer, & van Dijke, 2010). If a manager's role identity is insecure, the manager may be more likely to grant these requests of their subordinate in an effort to preserve their influence over that subordinate. If a manager feels secure in their role identity, the manager may be more likely to resist these requests of their subordinates because the manager has increased confidence that their influence over their subordinates will be maintained despite denying a subordinate's request. I predict that when a manager is self-perceived as necessary, that manager will be less likely to grant subordinates' requests because there will be a decrease in the self-perceived threat to the manager's role identity and an increase in confidence of maintaining their role despite resisting the influence o-f their subordinate. Furthermore, I predict that when a manager is self-perceived as unnecessary, that manager will be more likely to accede to their subordinates' requests because there will be an increase in the self-perceived threat to the manager's role identity and a reduced confidence of maintaining their role if they choose not to be influenced by their subordinate. Based on this rationale, I make the following hypothesis:

> *H5 — There is a negative relationship between a manager's self-perceived necessity and the granting behavior of a manager.*

Necessity of a Leader, Subordinate's Power, and Managers' Self-Interested Behaviors

As compared to those with less power, those with more power are particularly sensitive to threats to their power (Maner & Mead, 2010), and followers represent a very specific threat to a leader because a leader's power is largely contingent on a follower's willingness to be influenced (DeRue & Ashford, 2010; Hogg, 2010). A subordinate's power should interact with a manager's self-perception of necessity by affecting both a manager's perceived dependency on their subordinate and the level of identity threat a manager feels from their subordinates. If a manager is self-perceived as necessary, the manager should perceive his or her position and identity as a manager as more secure because the manager assumes that he or she is integral to the success of the organization (Bandura & Locke, 2003; Kerr & Jermier, 1978). If a subordinate has less power, the manager should feel less dependent on that subordinate (Copeland, 1994; Van Kleef et al., 2008; Zander et al., 1959). Altogether, the increased power of a subordinate and self-perceived necessity should work together to insulate a manager from their subordinate and create an environment where a manager feels both less threatened by negative assessments and more confident of maintaining power in spite of their behavior. In other words, if a manager feels needed and assesses their subordinate as less powerful, they should be more likely to engage in self-interested behavior because they expect the consequences of not behaving like prototypical manager to be attenuated.

Alternately, if a manager is self-perceived as unnecessary, the manager should perceive their position and identity as a manager as less secure because the manager is not integral to the success of the organization (Bandura & Locke, 2003; Kerr & Jermier, 1978). If a

subordinate has high power, the manager should feel closer to that subordinate (Copeland, 1994; Van Kleef et al., 2008; Zander et al., 1959). Altogether, the increased power of a subordinate and a self-perceived lack of necessity should work together to sensitize a manager to their subordinate's needs and create an environment where a manager feels both more threatened by negative assessments and more aware of non-prototypical leaders' behavior (see Figure 3 for a graphic representation of the interaction). In other words, if a manager does not feel needed and a higher power subordinate is salient, the manager should be less likely to engage in self-interested behavior because the consequences of being perceived as a nonprototypical leader are magnified.

At face value, it may seem plausible that a subordinate's power could also affect a leader's self-perceived necessity. I do not believe this is the case for two reasons. First, subordinates are subject to the power of their manager regardless of their own level of power. In theory, a manager's power subsumes the power of all their subordinates. In other words, a manager should have the control over their employees' pay, ability to influence others in the organization, and even the ability terminate their employment. Desire to keep a higher power employee may change, but one subordinate's power should not mitigate a

	Necessary Manager	Unnecessary Manager
High Subordinate Power	-	- -
Low Subordinate Power	+	-

Figure 3. Graphic representation of the predicted effect of leader's self-perceived necessity and subordinate's power on the self-interested behavior of a manager. Signs reflect the direction of the effect and multiple signs reflect an increased magnitude.

manager's ability to lead. Second, a subordinate's power should have no connection to the need for someone to lead. One might assume that higher power subordinates have more skills, abilities, or network ties, but self-perceived necessity is determined by the need for someone to coordinate and lead in a given context. In most cases, I do not believe that higher power subordinates are seen as a proxy or replacement for their manager. Higher power subordinates may be seen as more valuable or potentially even harder to influence, but I do not believe there is a direct connection between subordinate's power and a leader's self-perceived necessity. Based on this rationale, I make the following hypothesis:

> *H6 — The negative relationship between the power of a subordinate and the self-interested behavior of a manager is moderated by a manager's self-perceived necessity.*

Necessity of a Leader, Subordinate's Power, and Granting Behavior

The power of a subordinate and the self-perception of a leader's necessity should also interact to affect a manager's granting behavior. Because necessary managers with low-power followers should feel secure, confident, and insulated from their subordinates, managers should expend less effort to understand the needs of their subordinate and ascribe less value to maintaining the influence over their subordinate. Accordingly, necessary managers with low-power subordinates should be significantly less willing to grant requests from their subordinates (see Figure 4 for a graphic representation of the interaction).

Alternately, unnecessary managers with high-power followers should feel less secure, less confident, and more vulnerable to their subordinates. Additionally, unnecessary

	Necessary Manager	Unnecessary Manager
High Subordinate Power	+	++
Low Subordinate Power	-	+

Figure 4. Graphic representation of the predicted effect of leader's self-perceived necessity and subordinate's power on the granting behavior of a manager. Signs reflect the direction of the effect and multiple signs reflect an increased magnitude.

managers with high-power followers should expend more effort to understand the needs of their subordinates and ascribe more value to maintaining their influence over their subordinates. Accordingly, unnecessary managers with high-power subordinates should be significantly more willingly to grant the requests of their subordinates. Based on this rationale, I make the following hypothesis:

> *H7 — The positive relationship between the power of a subordinate and the granting behavior of their manager's behavior is moderated by a manager's self-perceived necessity.*

Summary

The present research tests these hypotheses through a series of experiments using different samples and design variations. First, I seek to show empirical evidence that the salience of a subordinate — as compared to the salience of a colleague or no one at all — attenuates the self-interested behavior of a manager and increases the influence of the subordinate. Next, I test to what degree the power of a subordinate differentially affects both the self-interested and granting behaviors of a manager. I then attempt to establish a

link between a manager's self-perceived necessity and both self-interested and granting behavior. Finally, I empirically test the full model by incorporating the interaction of both a subordinate's power and a leader's self-perceived necessity on a manager's behaviors.

CHAPTER 2

RESEARCH DESIGN

The theory developed here "reverses the lens" by depicting followers as agents of influence, and leaders as agents to be influenced. Seven experiments were conducted to explore the theoretical constructs discussed above. For clarity, I included a table (see Table 1) and discussion of variables that summarizes the definition and operationalization of each of the constructs of interest. Additionally, I include information regarding any adaptations (if applicable) of operationalizations from existing work.

Discussion of Variables

Dependent Variables

Self-Interested Behavior

Self-interested behavior is defined as actions that benefit the self, irrespective of the common good (Miller, 1999). In this study, self-interested behavior is measured in two ways. First, I assess the differential allocation captured using the ultimate bargaining game (described in detail in Study 1). One expression of the influence followers have on leaders is how individuals in positions of formal authority allocate resources. In my design, individuals have the opportunity to allocate themselves a greater amount of resources at the expense of other recipients (Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982). I interpret a

Table 1: List of Dependent Variables with Operationalizations.

Theoretical Construct	Definition	Operationalization	Adaptation
Dependent Variables			
Self-interested behavior (Studies 1-2 & 4-6)	Actions that benefit the self, irrespective of the common good (Miller, 1999)	Self-interested behavior is directly measured assessing allocation choices (Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982) and indirectly by assessing deceptive behaviors of allocators (Boles, Croson, & Murnighan, 2000).	Both measures of self-interest employ the UBG which is broadly used in the literature.
Granting behavior (Studies 4-6)	The bestowal of a claim tied to the identity of another (e.g. follower; DeRue & Ashford, 2010)	This variable measures the granting behavior of a leader by measuring the willingness of a manager to alter the allocation decisions based on a request from a subordinate.	This measure was adapted from DeRue and Ashford's (2010) description of granting behavior and is also treated as an independent variable in Study 2 by manipulating whether a subordinate makes a request of their manager.
Leader's necessity (Study 3)	The need for leadership in a given context (Hackman & Wageman, 2007)	This variable measures leader's self-perceived necessity by asking participants a single self-report question regarding the need for a leader	This is measured as a dependent variable in Study 3 to empirically establish its use in Studies 4-6.

differential allocation of resources as a direct indicator of self-interested behavior on the part of the manager.

Second, I assess self-interested behavior by measuring the allocator's willingness to deceive a recipient in the ultimatum bargaining game (Boles, Croson, & Murnighan, 2000). I measure the binary choice of whether or not an allocator chooses to lie to a recipient. Admittedly, deception is a broad and rich body of literature, and deception does not inherently mean an individual is being self-interested. However, for purposes of my design, the only obvious reason an individual would have to deceive another is to obfuscate a self-interested allocation. Therefore, I interpret lying to a recipient as an indirect indicator of self-interested behavior.

Granting Behavior

DeRue and Ashford (2010) define granting behavior as the bestowal of a claim tied to the identity of another (e.g., a follower agreeing to follow a leader). In my design, a hypothetical subordinate makes a request of their manager regarding the allocation in the ultimatum bargaining game. The request to allocate more money to a recipient acts as a claim, and the roles of subordinate and manager act as the identity cues. The granting of the request is measured by assessing the differential amount of money allocated. I interpret increased allocation to the recipient as increased granting behavior. [1]

Leader's Necessity

Leader's necessity is defined as the need of leadership in a given context (Hackman & Wageman, 2007). Leader's necessity is measured by asking participants a single self-report question regarding the need for a leader. Leader's necessity is measured as a dependent variable in Study 3 in order to empirically establish whether the constructs of substitutes for leadership and leader's self-efficacy are representative of a leader's necessity before using the leader's necessity as an independent variable in Studies 4-6.

Independent Variables

Subordinate's Power

Subordinate's power is defined as a subordinate's asymmetrical control of resources (Magee & Galinsky, 2008). The resources in question could involve a wide array of items including pay, decision control, influence, physical dominance, etc. In my design, I focus

[1] Granting behavior is also manipulated in Study 2 to ensure it is not significantly correlated with self-interested behavior in Studies 4-6.

on two resources that I felt were appropriate for manipulating the power of a subordinate: pay and organizational influence. Whereas other types of resources could have also been incorporated, I felt other resources were either not as organizationally relevant (e.g., physical dominance) or not as relevant to subordinates (e.g., decision control). I adapted my manipulation of subordinate power from descriptions of pay and influence found in Magee and Galinsky (2008; see Table 2 for a summary; see Study 2 for specific manipulations).

Leader's Necessity

Leader's necessity is a combination of the constructs of substitutes for leadership and leader's self-efficacy. As argued above, I believe both constructs are required to determine the necessity of a leader. Leader's necessity will be manipulated by either both the lack of perceived substitutes for leadership and the presence of leader self-efficacy or both the presence of perceived substitutes for leadership and the lack of leader's self-efficacy (see Study 4 for the specific manipulation). I empirically confirm that combining the constructs of substitutes for leadership and leader's self-efficacy is representative of a leader's necessity (see Study 3) before using the leader's necessity in the studies that follow.

Substitutes for Leadership

Substitutes for leadership are defined as organizational factors that affect a leader's behaviors and ability to lead (Kerr & Jermier, 1978). In my design, participants are given information regarding the need for a manager to effectively perform the task (see Study 3 for the specific manipulation). Kerr and Jermier (1978) describe multiple sources of

Table 2: List of Independent Variables with Operationalizations

Theoretical Construct	Definition	Operationalization	Adaptation
Independent Variables			
Subordinate's Power (Studies 1-2 & 4-6)	[A subordinate's] asymmetrical control of resources (Magee & Galinsky, 2008)	Manipulating descriptions of pay (high/low) and influence (high/low) (Magee & Galinsky, 2008)	This manipulation was adapted from descriptions of power found in Magee & Galinsky (2008).
Substitutes for leadership (Study 3)	Organizational factors that affect a leader's behaviors and ability to lead (Kerr & Jermier, 1978)	Manipulating information regarding the perceived need for a leader (substitutes present/not present) in a given context (Kerr & Jermier, 1978)	This manipulation uses the manipulation of the presence or absence of perceived substitutes for leadership found in Kerr and Jermier (1978).
Leader's self-efficacy (Study 3)	A particular form of self-efficacy that applies to one's self-assessment of skills, knowledge and abilities that are necessary to lead others in an organization (Hannah et al., 2008)	Manipulating information regarding the participants (high/low) ability to lead (Durham et al., 1997)	This manipulation was adapted from descriptions of leader's self-efficacy found in Durham and colleagues (1997).
Leader's necessity (Studies 4-6)	The need for leadership in a given context (Hackman & Wageman, 2007)	Manipulating both information regarding the perceived need for a leader (substitutes present/not present) in a given context *and* information regarding the participants (high/low) ability to lead	This manipulation is an amalgamation of both perceived substitutes for leadership and leader's self-efficacy. Also, measured as a dependent variable in Study 3.

potential substitutes, but at its root, substitutes for leadership are centrally about whether something else (person, task, or contextual factor) exists that could supplant the need for a leader. Similar to Kerr and Jermier, descriptions of the existing substitutes for leadership should alter participants' perceptions of their necessity as a manager.

Leader's Self-Efficacy

Leader's self-efficacy is defined as a particular form of self-efficacy that applies to one's self-assessment of skills, knowledge, and abilities that are necessary to lead others

in an organization (Hannah et al., 2008). In my design, participants will be told information regarding the reason they were selected for the manager role (see Study 3 for the specific manipulation). Even though individuals have a wide range of trait-based self-efficacy, Hannah and colleagues (2008) propose that assessments of ability should affect beliefs about leadership ability. In keeping with previous research, the assessments, although false, should effectively alter participants' perceptions of self-efficacy as a leader for this task.

Research Methodology

Study 1: Salience of Others and Relational Distance

The first study tests hypotheses 1a and 1b. Hypothesis 1a predicts that as compared to managers with no one salient, there is a negative relationship between the salience of a subordinate and the self-interested behavior of a manager. Hypothesis 1b predicts that as compared to the salience of a colleague, there is a negative relationship between the salience of a subordinate and the self-interested behavior of a manager. In this study, I use an adapted version of the ultimatum bargaining game and manipulate and examine how the salience of a subordinate affects the allocating behaviors of a manager.

There exist two significant potential alternative explanations regarding these hypotheses that I felt needed to be addressed within the design of Study 1: Relational Distance and Authority. It is plausible (but not expected) that a manager may alter their behavior based on their relational distance to a salient individual in their organization (e.g., levels of hierarchy between individuals). Also, it is plausible (but not expected) that a lack of direct authority over a salient individual could still alter a manager's behavior as

hypothesized (e.g., someone else's subordinate). To preemptively address these alternative explanations while testing the first hypotheses, both authority and relational closeness were manipulated and explored in this study.

Participants

Based on the results from an a priori power analysis with a power level of .80, an alpha probability of .05, and an effect size estimate of .20, I estimated I would need a total of 500 participants across five conditions to reach the desired level of power for this study. Participants were recruited through Amazon's Mechanical Turk (mTurk), an online participant database where online tasks are completed by participants in exchange for monetary compensation. As compared to samples of Western College students, mTurk samples are more diverse, and the data obtained from mTurk participants have been shown to be as reliable as data obtained using other collection methods in certain tasks amenable to online data collection (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). Furthermore, mTurk usage is becoming widely accepted among top tier management and psychology journal publications. Online participants were used for the majority of my studies because I am focusing on the effects of the attributes of followers on leaders' behaviors. Online studies allow for the study of the constructs of interest while avoiding interactions between leaders and followers that pose multiple confounds to specifically studying the effects of follower attributes. Future studies should then apply my findings to real groups with more complex interactions.

I made an a priori decision to omit all participants who failed a comprehension check question (see full comprehension check in the appropriate section below). Based on

previous experience with a similar design, 620 participants were recruited, allotting for a 24% comprehension check failure rate. Of the initial sample of 620 participants, 228 failed the comprehension check and their responses were removed from all further analyses. Whereas there was no significant difference in gender, ethnicity, education, or work experience between those who failed and those who passed the comprehension checks (both in this study and all that follow), it is possible that those who passed the comprehension checks may measure objectively higher on a personality dimension, such as conscientiousness, than those who failed. Conscientious individuals may take more care in reading the scenarios and be more likely to correctly answer the comprehension check questions. Although I do not have any data regarding the conscientiousness of participants in these studies, a future study that explores the potential correlation between contentiousness and comprehension check failures in mTurk would be beneficial.

Of the remaining 392 participants, 45% were female and the average age was 36.38 (*SD* = 11.52). Participants were all U.S. Citizens over the age of 18 and had an average of 13.26 years of full-time work experience (*SD* = 10.78). Ethnicities were self-reported as 79% White, 8% Asian, 6% Black, 4% Hispanic/Latino, and 2% other. Thirteen percent had a post-graduate degree, 38% had a bachelor's degree, 35% had some college experience, and 15% had a high school degree.

Design and Procedure

The hypotheses in this study were explored in a 2 (authority vs. no authority) x 2 (distant vs. close) + 1 (control) design with managers' allocation decisions and willingness to lie as the dependent variables. *Authority* and *relational distance* both represent

dimensions of alternative explanations to hypotheses H1a and H1b. Both were manipulated in this study to establish that a direct subordinate has a unique influence over their manager as compared to others in the organizational hierarchy. After obtaining informed consent, participants were asked to engage in a brief decision making exercise—the ultimate bargaining game or UBG (Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982). Participants were informed that they were the allocators of a sum of money ($100,000) and were tasked with dividing that money between themselves and a hypothetical recipient. Participants were informed that in this scenario the recipient would then decide whether to accept or reject the proposed allocation of money. If the recipient accepted, the money would be divided as proposed, but if the recipient rejected the offer, both parties would receive nothing. Participants were also informed that they could receive a real monetary bonus that would be dependent on their allocation decision (see Appendix A for full wording of the study instructions).

The *authority* and *relational distance* of the salient other were manipulated by embedding information in the scenario for the UBG. Participants were randomly placed into one of five conditions: *authority over close subordinate*, *authority over distant subordinate, no authority over close colleague, no authority over another's subordinate, or manager only.* In all conditions, the participants were told that they were a manager at a company and were responsible for allocating a monetary bonus to themselves and another manager that was equally deserving of their bonus.

In the *authority over close subordinate* condition, participants read that they were paired with one of their direct subordinates who would help with the logistics of the allocation decision. In this condition, participants read that, in the past, they had worked

closely with this subordinate. In the *authority over distant subordinate* condition, participants read that they were paired with one of their subordinate's subordinates who would help with the logistics of the allocation decision. In this condition, participants read that, in the past, they had never worked with their subordinate's subordinate. In the *no authority over close colleague* condition, participants read that they were paired with one of their colleagues who would help with the logistics of the allocation decision. In this condition, participants read that, in the past, they had worked closely with this colleague. In the *no authority over another's subordinate* condition, participants read that they were paired with one of their colleague's subordinates who would help with the logistics of the allocation decision. In this condition, participants read that, in the past, they had never worked with this colleague's subordinate. In the *manager only/control* condition, participants were given no additional information about others being salient for their deliberation. In all conditions, participants were told that, as managers, they were solely responsible for the allocation decision

There were two adaptations in Study 1 that deviated from the original UBG. First, the present study allowed, but did not require, allocators to inform recipients of the total sum of money to be allocated (see Boles, Croson, & Murnighan, 2000). This enabled participants to potentially misrepresent the total amount of money that was allocated to the recipients and allowed for another measure of self-interested behavior on the part of the allocator. Second, in an effort to increase the psychological realism of the study, the participants were informed that the way in which they allocated the pool of funds would directly affect a real monetary bonus that they could receive. Specifically, each $1,000 of hypothetical money represented $0.01 of real monetary bonus. If participants allocated

themselves $100,000, the actual mTurk bonus would have been $1. If participants allocated themselves $50,000 and split the other $50,000 with the recipient, participants would have received a $0.50 bonus.

In my own experience, many mTurk participants would take the whole monetary bonus for themselves if there were no ramifications for allocating too much money to themselves. For this reason, two brief pilot studies were run to avoid a potential ceiling affect caused by many participants simply taking the full amount possible. In the Pilot Study 1, 50 participants were given a scenario with the same UBG scenario above, but asked to take the perspective of the salient other individual. Participants were asked at what point, if any, they would inform recipients of the actual size of the pool of funds that the allocator could have potentially misrepresented (see Appendix B for full wording of the study instructions). Sixty percent of participants indicated that they would tell the recipient the total pool of funds after the allocation.

In the Pilot Study 2, 25 participants were asked to take the perspective of the recipient. These participants were asked what type of allocation would be acceptable and at what point they would reject the allocation (see Appendix C for full wording of the study instructions). The mean rejection amount was $35,400 (*SD* = 20,680) meaning that any amount under $35,400 would be rejected. Afterwards, they were also given information that the allocator may have misrepresented the size of the pool of funds and asked how any misrepresentations might change their acceptance of the allocation of money. The mean rejection amount after being lied too ($35,600) did not significantly differ from the original rejection amount.

In Study 1, participants were informed of both pilot studies and told that their allocation

of resources were accepted or rejected based on the findings from the two pilot studies. In other words, if participants made the allocation too unreasonable, as determined by the pilot studies, they would lose out on a real-world monetary bonus. This created a situation where the participants were motivated to take as much as they are able, but not so much that they would lose out on the bonus entirely. After the allocators proposed the distribution of money and chose how to represent the total pool of money to recipients, participants completed a manipulation check—including a measure of the power of the salient other party (if applicable)—and a brief demographics survey. Within a week of survey completion, participants were informed if the distribution of funds was accepted, and the allocation bonus was paid if had they allotted no more than $64,600 to themselves.

Measures

Self-interested behavior. Self-interested behavior was measured in two ways. First, individuals had the opportunity to allocate themselves a greater amount of resources (any amount from $0 to $100,000) at the expense of other recipients (Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982). Because this is an individual bonus and the potential salient other receives no benefit from larger self-allocations, I interpreted a differential allocation of resources as a direct indicator of self-interested behavior on the part of the allocator.

Second, allocators were given the opportunity to deceive recipients regarding the total pool of resources available in the ultimatum bargaining game (Boles, Croson, & Murnighan, 2000). A lie was any amount told to a recipient other than $100,000. I interpreted lying to a recipient as an indirect indicator of self-interested behavior.

Comprehension check. Participants were asked “Who else was present while you

made the allocation decision?" with possible responses being 1 (no one), 2 (your subordinate's subordinate), 3 (a direct subordinate), 4 (a colleague), or 5 (a colleague's subordinate). I made an a priori decision to omit all subjects that failed the comprehension check.

Results

Manipulation check. To check the efficacy of the authority manipulation, participants were asked to rate their power relative to the salient other with potential responses ranging from 1 (no power) to 7 (a lot of power). Using a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA), I dummy coded the independent variable *authority* as either 1 — authority or 0 — no authority. The response to the question regarding relative power was the dependent variable. Participants in the authority condition properly identified their relative power as higher (M = 3.83, SD = 1.25), and participants in the no authority condition properly identified their relative power as lower (M = 3.32, SD = 1.12). The two conditions were also significantly different from each other $F(1, 272) = 12.624$, $p < .001$, $\eta 2 = .045$. These results indicate that the manipulation of authority was effective.

To check the efficacy of the relational distance manipulation, participants were asked to rate the likability and sociability of the salient other with potential responses ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Likability and sociability were used as manipulation checks for relational distance because I viewed these constructs as the potential driving mechanism behind why relational distance could alter the relationship between a manager's self-interested behavior and the salient of another. Whereas this manipulation check does not directly measure perceptions of relational distance, it does

test the facets of relational distance with which I was most concerned. Using a one-way ANOVA, I dummy coded the independent variable *relational distance* as either 1 — close or 0 — distant. An aggregate of the responses to the questions regarding the subordinate's likability and sociability was the dependent variable. Participants in the close condition properly identified the salient other as higher in likability and sociability (M = 4.38, SD = 1.12), and participants in the distant condition properly identified the salient other as lower in likability and sociability (M = 4.02, SD = 1.13). The two conditions were also significantly different from each other $F(1, 272) = 6.741$, $p = .010$, $\eta 2 = .024$ These results indicate that the manipulation of relational distance was effective.

Study results. The dummy codes from the manipulation check were used to create the two dimensions of each independent variable: *authority* (1 = authority, 0 = no authority) and *relational distance* (1 = close, 0 = distant). To test the significance of each dimension and their interaction, I used a 2 x 2 ANOVA where *authority* and r*elational distance* were the independent variables and allocation to self and willingness to lie were the dependent variables, respectively. As predicted, participants with a subordinate present allocated less to themselves (M = \$55,543, SD = \$9,939) than participants with someone outside their authority salient (M = \$59,729, SD = \$15,683), $F(1, 392) = 8.77$, $p = .003$, $\eta 2 = .022$, and participants with subordinates salient lied marginally less to recipients (M = .267, SD = .44) than participants with someone outside their authority salient (M = .332, SD = .47), $F(1, 389) = 2.789$, $p = .098$, $\eta 2 = .007$. Also as predicted, relational distance was not a significant predictor of participant's allocations, $F(1, 392) = 2.282$, $p = .132$, $\eta 2 = .006$ nor lying, $F(1, 389) = 2.01$, $p = .157$, $\eta 2 = .005$. See Table 3 for all means, standard deviations, and correlations.

Table 3: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations

	M	*SD*	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(1) Authority	.51	.50	—			
(2) Relational Distance	.52	.50	.08	—		
(3) Allocation (Self)	$57,538	$13,202	-.17**	-.09	—	
(4) Lie to Recipient	.30	.46	-.07	-.06	.67**	—

Note. N = 392. Authority is coded 1 = authority, 0 = no authority. Relational Distance is coded 1 = close, 0 = distant
** p < .01

To directly test Hypothesis 1a — that as compared to managers with no one salient, there is a negative relationship between the salience of a subordinate and the self-interested behavior of a manager — I dummy coded a *role salience* variable where 1 = close authority (subordinate) and 0 = no one salient (control). I conducted one-way ANOVA's where *role salience* was the independent variable and allocation to self and lying were the dependent variables, respectively. Participants with a close subordinate salient allocated less to themselves (M = $54,500, SD = $9,780) than participants with no one salient (M = $61,887, SD = $15,850), $F(1, 194) = 13.454$, $p < .001$, $\eta 2 = .066$. Participants with a close subordinate salient also lied less to recipients (M = .27, SD = .45) than participants with no one salient (M = .46, SD = .50), $F(1, 193) = 7.074$, $p = .008$, $\eta 2 = .036$. These results support Hypothesis 1 and suggest that the salience of a subordinate reduces self-interested allocations and reduces a participant's likelihood of lying to a recipient.

To directly test Hypothesis 1b — that as compared to the salience of a colleague, there is a negative relationship between the salience of a subordinate and the self-interested behavior of a manager — I dummy coded a *role type* variable where 1 = close authority (subordinate) and 0 = close no authority (colleague). I again conducted one-way ANOVA's where *role type* was the independent variable and allocation to self and lying were the dependent variables, respectively. Participants with a close subordinate salient allocated

less to themselves (M = \$54,500, SD = \$9,780) than participants with a close colleague salient (M = \$58,828, SD = \$15,059), $F(1, 142) = 4.258$, $p = .041$, $\eta 2 = .03$. The type of salient other did not significantly affect a participant's willingness to lie to a recipient. These results mostly support Hypothesis 1b and again suggest that the salience of a subordinate, as compared to the salience of a colleague, reduces self-interested allocations. See Table 4 for all means and standard deviations by condition. See Table 5 and 6 for 2 x 2 ANOVA tables.

Discussion

Results from Study 1 support Hypotheses 1A and 1B by demonstrating that the salience of a subordinate has a unique influence over managers' self-interested behavior as compared to the salience of others in the organizational hierarchy or the lack of anyone salient. In all future studies, I will only be exploring the salience of a subordinate (as opposed to others in the organizational hierarchy) to better understand how the power of a subordinate affects managers' behaviors. Also, because the relational distance of a subordinate (close versus distant) did not significantly alter self-interested behaviors, all future studies refer to the salient other as simply 'subordinates' as opposed to 'direct subordinates.

Study 2A: Subordinate's Power and Granting Behavior With One Recipient

The second study tested Hypothesis 2 that predicts that there is a negative relationship between the power of a subordinate and the self-interested behavior of a manager. In this

Table 4: Means and Standard Deviations by Condition

	Allocation (Self)		Lie	
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*
Close Authority	$54,500	$9,780	.27	.45
Distant Authority	$56,585	$10,099	.26	.44
Close No Authority	$58,828	$15,059	.27	.45
Distant No Authority	$60,629	$16,308	.39	.49
Control (No one)	$61,887	$15,850	.46	.50

Note. N (Allocation (Self) = 392. N (Lie) = 389.

Table 5: 2x2 ANOVA – Allocation (Self)

	df	*F*	*p*	η2
Authority	1	8.77	.003	.022
Relational Distance	1	2.282	.132	.006
Authority X Relational Distance	1	.026	.872	.000

Note. N = 392.

Table 6: 2x2 ANOVA – Willingness to Lie

	df	*F*	*p*	η2
Authority	1	2.789	.098	.007
Relational Distance	1	2.01	.157	.005
Authority X Relational Distance	1	2.658	.104	.007

Note. N = 389.

study, I again used an adapted version of the ultimatum bargaining game and manipulated and examined how the power of a subordinate affected the allocating and lying behaviors of a manager.

Participants

Based on results from an a priori power analysis with a desired power level of .80, an alpha probability of .05, and an effect size estimate of .20, 400 mTurk participants were needed to reach the desired level of power for this study. Because of the similarities between Studies 1 and 2a, I used the comprehension check failure rate from Study 1 combined with the desired power for Study 2a to estimate that I should need 663 total participants. Of the initial sample of 663 participants, 311 failed at least one of two comprehension checks and their responses were removed from all further analyses. Of the remaining 352 participants, 45% were female and the average age was 36.05 (*SD* = 11.28). Participants were all U.S. citizens over the age of 18 and had an average of 13.01 years of full-time work experience (*SD* = 10.23). Ethnicities were self-reported as 76% White, 10% Asian, 6% Black, 5% Hispanic, and 2% other. Seventeen percent had a postgraduate degree, 36% had a bachelor's degree, 32% had some college experience, and 15% had a high school degree.

Design and Procedure

The participants in this study were randomly placed into one of four conditions by manipulating two dimensions (2 x 2 design): *subordinate's power* (high subordinate's power vs. low subordinate's power) and *subordinate's request* (request vs. no request).

Managers' allocation decisions and willingness to lie were the dependent variables. *Subordinate's request* was manipulated in this design to both explore the effects of requests from subordinates on managers' behavior and to ensure in the following studies that subordinate's requests were not significantly correlated with a participant's self-interested behavior (see Appendix D for full wording of the study instructions).

After obtaining informed consent, participants engaged in the same UBG scenario from Study 1. *Subordinate's power* and *subordinate's request* were manipulated by embedding information in the scenario for the UBG. Participants read that they were in a group with one of their subordinates who was to help with the logistics of the allocation decision, but that, as managers, they were solely responsible for the allocation decision. In the high-power subordinate condition, participants read that they were working with one of their higher paid and more influential subordinates. In the low-power subordinate condition, participants read that they were working with one of their lower paid and less influential subordinates. In the subordinate request condition, participants read that their subordinate would appreciate it if the recipient would receive more of the pool of available money. In the no subordinate request condition, participants were given no additional information regarding the subordinate.

The same design adaptations and pilot studies that were used in Study 1 were used in Study 2.

Measures

Self-interested behavior. Self-interested behavior was measured in the same two ways as in Study 1: directly through the self-allocation of resources and indirectly through the

potential misrepresentation of the pool of funds.

Comprehension checks. Participants were asked, "Please describe the subordinate that is helping you with the logistics of the allocation?" with possible responses being 1 (more influential and higher paid), 2 (less influential and lesser paid), or 3 (no information was given). Participants were also asked, "What request did your subordinate make?" with possible responses being 1 (no request was made), 2 (to give the other manager more money), or 3 (to keep all the money for yourself). I made an a priori decision to omit all subjects that failed either of the two comprehension checks.

Results

Manipulation check. To check the efficacy of the power manipulation, participants were asked to rate the power of the salient subordinate with potential responses ranging from 1 (no power) to 7 (a lot of power). Using a one-way ANOVA, I dummy coded the independent variable *subordinate's power* as either 1 — high power or 0 — low power. The response to the question regarding the subordinate's power was the dependent variable. Participants in the high power condition properly identified the salient subordinate as higher in power (M = 4.88, SD = 0.82), and participants in the low-power condition properly identified the salient subordinate as lower in power (M = 3.23, SD = 1.11). The two conditions were also significantly different from each other $F(1, 351) = 230.911$, $p < .001$, $\eta 2 = .397$. These results indicate that the manipulation of *subordinate's power* was effective.

Study results. Dummy codes were used to create two dimensions of each independent variable: *subordinate's power* (1 = high subordinate's power, 0 = low subordinate's power)

and *subordinate's request* (1 = request, 0 = no request). To test Hypothesis 2 — that there is a negative relationship between the power of a subordinate and the self-interested behavior of a manager — I used a 2 x 2 ANOVA where *subordinate's power* and *subordinate's request* were the independent variables and allocation to self and willingness to lie were the dependent variables, respectively. Contrary to expectations, the power of a subordinate was not a significant predictor of participants' allocations to recipients, $F(1, 352) = 2.50$, $p = .115$, $\eta 2 = .007$ nor lying, $F(1, 347) = .108$, $p = .742$, $\eta 2 < .001$. See Table 7 for all means, standard deviations, and correlations. These initial results do not support Hypothesis 2 and potentially suggest that there may be no relationship between a subordinate's power and the self-interested behavior of a manager.

Upon further exploratory analysis, it appears that the *subordinate's request* condition may have washed out all effects from *subordinate's* power. Participants receiving requests from subordinates allocated less to themselves (M = \$52,033, SD = \$13,379) than participants the received no request (M = \$56,511, SD = \$13,394), $F(1, 352) = 9.154$, $p = .003$, $\eta 2 = .026$, although a request from a subordinate was not a significant predictor of lying to recipients $F(1, 347) = .176$, $p = .675$, $\eta 2 = .001$. Initially, a one-way ANOVA was run where the interaction of *subordinate's power* and *subordinate's request* was the independent variable, and allocation to self and willingness to lie were the dependent variables, respectively. This interaction had a marginal effect on allocations to self $F(1, 352) = 2.618$, $p = .107$, $\eta 2 = .007$, but did not significantly affect a participant's willingness to lie $F(1, 347) = .151$, $p = .151$, $\eta 2 = .000$.

For further analysis, a one-way ANOVA was run where the dummy code for *subordinate's power* was the independent variable, and allocation to self and willingness

Table 7: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations

	M	*SD*	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(1) Subordinate's Power	.52	.50	—			
(2) Request	.41	.49	.03	—		
(3) Allocation (Self)	$54,553	$13,892	-.08	.18**	—	
(4) Lie to Recipient	.33	.47	-.02	.03	.53**	—

Note. N = 352. Subordinate's power is coded 1 = high subordinate's power, 0 = low subordinate's power. Request is coded 1 = request, 0 = no request.
** $p < .01$

to lie were the dependent variables, respectively. All participants in the request condition were omitted for this analysis. As predicted, participants with a high-power subordinate salient allocated less to themselves (M = $54,143, SD = $10,827) than participants with a low-power subordinate salient (M = $58,877, SD = $15,961), $F(1, 182) = 5.074$, $p = .025$, $\eta 2 = .027$. Again, a subordinate's power was not a significant predictor of lying to recipients $F(1, 181) = .289$, $p = .269$, $\eta 2 = .001$. See Table 8 for means and standard deviations by condition, These results do provide support for Hypothesis 2 and suggest that there may actually be a relationship between a subordinate's power and the self-interested behavior of a manager if a subordinate's request were not washing out the effect of a subordinate's power. See Table 9 and 10 for 2 x 2 ANOVA tables.

Discussion

Results from Study 2a give mixed support of Hypothesis 2 by demonstrating the salience of a high-power subordinate has a stronger influence over managers' self-interested behavior as compared to the salience of low-power subordinate, but only in the absence of a request from that subordinate. In the design of Study 2a, I believe that a subordinate's request regarding an allocation is in direct opposition to potential self-

Table 8: Means and Standard Deviations by Condition

	Allocation (Self)		Lie	
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*
High Power with Request	$52,060	$14,589	.32	.47
Low Power with Request	$52,005	$12,169	.32	.47
High Power No Request	$54,143	$10,827	.33	.47
Low Power No Request	$58,877	$15,961	.36	.48

Note. N = Allocation (Self) = 352. N (Lie) = 347.

Table 9: 2x2 ANOVA – Allocation (Self)

	df	*F*	*p*	η2
Subordinate's Power	1	2.50	.115	.007
Subordinate's Request	1	9.154	.003	.026
Subordinate's Power X Subordinate's Request	1	2.618	.107	.007

Note. N = 352.

Table 10: 2x2 ANOVA – Willingness to Lie

	df	*F*	*p*	η2
Subordinate's Power	1	.108	.742	.000
Subordinate's Request	1	.176	.675	.001
Subordinate's Power X Subordinate's Request	1	.151	.698	.000

Note. N = 347.

interested desires on the part of participants. In other words, satisfying the subordinate's request (less allocation to self) would mean subverting a participant's potential self-interested desires (higher allocation to self). The normative power of a direct request is likely overriding the less normatively acceptable influence of self-interest. In order to allow for both self-interested and granting behaviors to exist simultaneously, I chose to create an additional study (Study 2B) where participants remain the allocator, but there exist two

recipients instead of one. The subordinate's request is only regarding the allocation made regarding the allocation to the first recipient. Therefore, participants can still allocate more to the first recipient and satisfy their self-interest by allocating less money to the second recipient.

Study 2B: Subordinate's Power and Granting Behavior With Two Recipients

Due to the findings of what was intended as Study 2 (listed above as Study 2A), I chose to run another study that was not initially planned (Study 2B). Based on the above findings, I felt that the normative power of granting a direct request overrode the potential self-interested behavior. I chose to run Study 2 again, but this time I used two recipients. My intent was to create a design where an allocator could grant a request to allocate more funds to one of two recipients, but still engage in self-interested behavior if they felt so inclined (see *Procedure* section below for the design changes). In this study, I test both Hypothesis 2 that predicts there is a negative relationship between the power of a subordinate and the self-interested behavior of a manager, and Hypothesis 3 that predicts there is a negative relationship between the power of a subordinate and the granting behavior of a manager.

Participants

Based on results from an a priori power analysis with a desired power level of .80, an alpha probability of .05, and an effect size estimate of .20, 400 mTurk participants were needed to reach the desired level of power for this study. Because of the similarities between Studies 2a and 2b, I used the comprehension check failure rate from Study 2a to

estimate that I should need 800 total participants. Of the initial sample of 800 participants, 327 failed at least one of two comprehension checks and their responses were removed from all further analyses. Of the remaining 473 participants, 46% were female and the average age was 34.7 (*SD* = 10.53). Participants were all U.S. citizens over the age of 18 and had an average of 12.23 years of full-time work experience (*SD* = 9.99). Ethnicities were self-reported as 79% White, 9% Asian, 7% Hispanic/Latino, 6% Black, and 3% other. Sixteen percent had a postgraduate degree, 36% had a bachelor's degree, 32% had some college experience, and 15% had a high school degree.

Design and Procedure

The design in Study 2b was identical to that of Study 2A with two exceptions. First, participants were informed that they were the allocators of a sum of money ($100,000) and were tasked with dividing the money between themselves and two hypothetical recipients (as opposed to one recipient in the previous studies). Participants were informed that in this scenario each of the recipients would then decide whether to accept or reject the proposed allocation of money. If both recipients accepted, the money would be divided as proposed, but if either of the recipients rejected the offer, both parties would receive nothing (see Appendix E for full wording of the study instructions). Another pilot study using 25 mTurk subjects (Pilot 3) was run to determine at what point each recipient would potentially reject the allocation in a two recipient scenario (see Appendix F for full wording of the study instructions). The mean rejection amount was $23,550, which represented the minimum amount of allocation each recipient was willing to accept.

The second difference was that the request made from a salient subordinate asked the

allocator to give more money to the first of the two recipients. By having two recipients who could receive different amounts allocated to them, I was able to explore the difference in the funds allocated to the first recipient versus the second recipient. I used this difference score as a measure of the manager's granting behavior. I chose to use a difference score instead of a ratio due to the potential complications of using a ratio when an allocation of zero is possible.

This design enabled participants to satisfy a request made by a subordinate and also allowed for participants to satisfy their self-interest by allocating less money to the second recipient, if desired. An added benefit of this variation is that the design captures both self-interested and granting behaviors without having to use separate conditions — effectively halving the required number of participants in future studies. This design should be particularly efficient for any future studies carried out in a lab setting.

Measures

Self-interested behavior. *S*elf-interested behavior was measured in the same two ways as in the two previous studies: directly through the self-allocation of resources and indirectly through the misrepresentation of the pool of funds

Granting. Granting behavior was measured in three ways. First, granting behavior was measured by the difference score of the allocations to the first and second recipients. Second, granting behavior was measured as a ratio of the allocation to the first recipient to the second recipient. Third, granting was measured as the amount of deviation from an equal split of the remaining funds after the allocation to self. An a priori analysis of these variables using all possible allocations determined that, although these variables are

strongly correlated, the means were significantly different. Because the means demonstrated a significant difference, I ran all three measures of granting behavior to ensure the reliability of only reporting difference scores as a measure of granting behavior for further studies. In all cases (through this study and the studies to follow), the three measures of granting behavior demonstrated roughly identical levels of significance. For parsimony, I chose to only report the difference scores because all three measure demonstrate roughly equal results. This measure should be a direct measure of a participant's willingness to grant a request from a subordinate.

Comprehension checks. Participants were asked, "Please describe the subordinate that is helping you with the logistics of the allocation?" with possible responses being 1 (more influential and higher paid), 2 (less influential and lesser paid), or 3 (no information was given). Participants were also asked, "What request did your subordinate make?" with possible responses being 1 (no request was made), 2 (to give the other manager more money), or 3 (to keep all the money for yourself. I made an a priori decision to omit all subjects that failed either of the two comprehension checks.

Results

Manipulation check. To check the efficacy of the power manipulation, participants were again asked to rate the power of the salient subordinate with potential responses ranging from 1 (no power) to 7 (a lot of power). Using a one-way ANOVA, I dummy coded the independent variable *subordinate's power* as either 1 — high-power subordinate or 0 — low-power subordinate. The response to the question regarding the subordinate's power was the dependent variable. Participants in the high-power subordinate condition properly

identified the salient subordinate as higher in power (M = 4.87, SD = 0.87), and participants in the low-power subordinate condition properly identified the salient subordinate as lower in power (M = 3.34, SD = 1.06). The two conditions were also significantly different from each other $F(1, 472) = 297.30$, $p < .001$, $\eta 2 = .387$. These results indicate that the manipulation of *subordinate's power* was effective.

Study results. Dummy codes were again used to create two dimensions of each independent variable: *subordinate's power* (1 = high subordinate's power, 0 = low subordinate's power) and *subordinate's request* (1 = request, 0 = no request). To test Hypothesis 2 — that there is a negative relationship between the power of a subordinate and the self-interested behavior of a manager — I used a 2 x 2 ANOVA where *subordinate's power* and *subordinate's request* were the independent variables and allocation to self and willingness to lie were the dependent variables, respectively. There was no main effect for power of the subordinate on participant's allocations to recipients, $F(1, 472) = .815$, $p = .367$, $\eta 2 = .002$ nor lying, $F(1, 472) = .005$, $p = .942$, $\eta 2 < .001$. Although some results from Study 2a suggested the opposite, these results do not support Hypothesis 2 and potentially suggest that there may be no relationship between a subordinate's power and the self-interested behavior of a manager.

To test Hypothesis 3 — that predicts there is a negative relationship between the power of a subordinate and the granting behavior of a manager — I used the same 2 x 2 ANOVA where *subordinate's power* and *subordinate's request* were the independent variables and difference in allocations to the two recipients was the dependent variable. The results indicate that participants were significantly more likely to grant a high-power subordinate's request (M = \$3,907, SD = \$6,990) than a low-power subordinate's request (M = \$2,099,

SD = $7,164), $F(1, 472) = 5.762$, $p = .017$, $\eta 2 = .012$. See Table 11 for means, standard deviations, and correlations. See Table 12 for means and standard deviations by condition. These results show support for Hypothesis 3 and suggest that there is a relationship between a subordinate's power and the granting behavior of a manager. See Table 13, 14, and 15 for 2 x 2 ANOVA tables.

Discussion

Although some evidence in Study 2A provided support for Hypothesis 2, results from Study 2b do not support Hypothesis 2 by failing to demonstrate that the salience of a high-power subordinate has a stronger influence over managers' self-interested behavior as compared to the salience of low-power subordinate. Results from this study do support Hypothesis 3 by demonstrating that a request made by a salient high-power subordinate has a stronger influence over a manager's granting behavior as compared to a request made by a salient low-power subordinate.

Study 3: Necessity of a Leader

In this study, I combined the constructs of substitutes for leadership and leaders' self-efficacy to measure the necessity of a leader. Whereas this study did not directly test any hypotheses, Study 3 empirically tested how well these two constructs assess a leader's necessity. Leaders' necessity is not a new construct but a combination of two existing constructs that represent the two dimensions that I believe are vital in determining the need for a leader. I argue that only managers who do not have (do have) salient substitutes for leadership *and* have high (low) leader self-efficacy will be self-perceived as more (less)

Table 11: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations

	M	*SD*	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
(1) Subordinate's Power	.51	.50	—					
(2) Request	.54	.50	.02	—				
(3) Allocation (Self)	$46,620	$18,127	-.04	-0.02	—			
(4) Lie to Recipient 1	.78	.41	.00	-0.002	-.48**	—		
(5) Lie to Recipient 2	.76	.43	-.04	-0.07	-.47**	.88**	—	
(6) Allocation Difference (R1 - R2)	$1,826	$5,992	.12*	.22**	0.04	0.02	-.07	—

Note. N = 473. Subordinate's power is coded 1 = high subordinate's power, 0 = low subordinate's power. Request is coded 1 = request, 0 = no request.
* p < .05. ** p < .01.

Table 12: Means and Standard Deviations by Condition

	Allocation (Self)		Allocation (R1 - R2)		Lie (Recipient 1)		Lie (Recipient 2)	
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*
High Power with Request	$45,604	$17,493	$3,907	$6,990	.77	.43	.67	.47
Low Power with Request	$46,871	$18,600	$2,099	$7,164	.80	.40	.79	.41
High Power No Request	$46,209	$18,088	$807	$5,471	.81	.40	.82	.39
Low Power No Request	$47,967	$18,535	$37	$716	.76	.43	.76	.43

Note. N = 472.

Table 13: 2x2 ANOVA – Allocation (Self)

	df	*F*	*p*	η2
Subordinate's Power	1	.815	.367	.002
Subordinate's Request	1	.258	.612	.001
Subordinate's Power X Subordinate's Request	1	.021	.884	.000

Note. N = 472.

Table 14: 2x2 ANOVA – Granting

	df	*F*	*p*	η2
Subordinate's Power	1	5.762	.017	.012
Subordinate's Request	1	23.093	.000	.047
Subordinate's Power X Subordinate's Request	1	.932	.335	.002

Note. N = 472.

Table 15: 2x2 ANOVA – Willingness to Lie

	df	*F*	*p*	η2
Subordinate's Power	1	.005	.942	.000
Subordinate's Request	1	.001	.973	.000
Subordinate's Power X Subordinate's Request	1	1.156	.283	.002

Note. $N = 472$.

necessary. Additionally, I planned to collapse the off diagonal conditions in the latter studies contingent on the findings of this study.

Participants

Based on results from an a priori power analysis with a desired power level of .80, an alpha probability of .05, and an effect size estimate of .20, 400 mTurk participants were needed to reach the desired level of power for this study. I estimated that I would need 500 total participants to reach the desired level of power. Of the initial sample of 500 participants, 206 failed at least one of two comprehension checks and their responses were removed from all further analyses. Additionally, five participants failed to fill out any data. Of the remaining 289 participants, 48% were female and the average age was 36.46 (*SD* = 11.85). Participants were all U.S. Citizens over the age of 18 and had an average of 13.87 years of full-time work experience (*SD* = 11.20). Ethnicities were self-reported as 79% White, 7% Black, 6% Asian, 5% Hispanic/Latino, and 3% other. Fifteen percent had a postgraduate degree, 38% had a bachelor's degree, 32% had some college experience, and 15% had at least obtained a high school degree.

Design and Procedure

The extent to which substitutes for leadership and leader's self-efficacy effectively measure leader's self-perceived necessity was explored by manipulating two dimensions (2 x 2 design): *substitutes for leadership* and *leader's self-efficacy.* Self-assessment of the participant's necessity was the dependent variable. After obtaining informed consent, participants were asked to read and answer questions regarding a brief scenario. Participants were informed that they were managers at a company and asked to determine how actively they should manage their team for a given task. They were given information regarding the company, the task, and their subordinates and then asked questions regarding how necessary they were to the successful completion of the task (see Appendix G for full wording of the study instructions).

Participants were randomly placed into one of four conditions, and *substitutes for leadership* and *leader's self-efficacy* were manipulated by embedding information in the scenario. In the perceived substitutes not present condition, participants were told that the task had complex considerations and thus required strong leadership. In the perceived substitutes present condition, participants were told that the task was simple and straightforward and thus did not require strong leadership. In the high leader's self-efficacy condition, participants were told that they were the managers of this task because of their strong ability to effectively manage their team. In the low leader's self-efficacy condition, participants were told that they were the manager of this task despite lacking any particular abilities to effectively manage their team. Participants reported on their self-perceptions of the necessity of the leader (themselves) in the scenario. Both *leader's self-efficacy* and *substitutes for leadership* were also measured to ensure the efficacy of the manipulations.

Measures

Leader's necessity. Leader's necessity was measured using a one-item self-report question that asked participants to rate their self-perceived necessity in regards to the bonus allocation scenario with potential responses ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).

Comprehension checks. Participants were asked, "Please describe the allocation?" with possible responses being 1 (complex), 2 (simple and straightforward), or 3 (no information was given). Participants were also asked, "Regarding the scenario, please describe your leadership abilities relative to the task to allocate $100,000?" with possible responses being 1 (you were chosen because of your strong ability to lead), 2 (you were chosen despite lacking any particular ability to lead), or 3 (no information was given). I made an a priori decision to omit all subjects that failed either of the two comprehension checks.

Results

Manipulation checks. To check the effectiveness of the efficacy manipulation, participants were asked to rate their self-efficacy using Robertson and Sadri's (1993) managerial self-efficacy scale (see Appendix H for complete measure). Participants were given a list of 11 statements regarding their ability to manage and asked to rate themselves with potential responses ranging from 1 (almost always untrue) to 5 (almost always true). Using a one-way ANOVA, I dummy coded the independent variable *leader's self-efficacy* as either 1 — high leader's self-efficacy or 0 — low leader's self-efficacy. Responses to the managerial self-efficacy scale were aggregated and used as the dependent variable.

Participants in the high self-efficacy condition properly rated themselves as higher in leader's self-efficacy (M = 4.09, SD = 0.57), and participants in the low self-efficacy condition properly rated themselves as lower in leader's self-efficacy (M = 3.60, SD = 0.76). The two conditions were also significantly different from each other $F(1, 288) = 39.63$, $p < .001$, $\eta 2 = .121$. These results indicate that the manipulation of leader's self-efficacy was effective.

To check the effectiveness of the substitutes for leadership manipulation, participants were asked to rate the substitutes for leadership present using Podsakoff and MacKenzie's (1993) condensed substitutes for leadership scale (condensed from the original substitutes for leadership scale; Kerr & Jermier, 1978). Participants were given a list of 13 statements regarding 13 different types of a substitutes for leadership (see Appendix I for complete measure) and with potential responses ranging from 1 (almost always untrue) to 5 (almost always true). Using a one-way ANOVA, I dummy coded the independent variable *substitutes for leadership* as either 1 — substitutes not present or 0 — substitutes present. Responses to the condensed substitutes for leadership scale were aggregated and used as the dependent variable. Participants in the substitutes not present condition did not properly rate substitutes for leadership as less present (M = 3.29, SD = 0.36), and participants in the substitutes present condition did not properly rate substitutes for leadership as more present (M = 3.28, SD = 0.31). The two conditions were also not significantly different from each other $F(1, 289) = .038$, $p < .846$, $\eta 2 = .000$. These results indicate that the manipulation of was not effective even though the overall results of the study suggested that it was effective.

To address this issue, I ran a brief study using 200 mTurk participants in two conditions: substitutes for leadership not present or substitutes for leadership present. The

participants read, “Imagine that you are a manager at a Fortune 500 company. Your boss has asked you to allocate a $100,000 bonus. Your subordinates at work will help you with the decision, but you will ultimately get the final say over the allocation decision.” (This task has complex considerations and thus requires strong leadership/This task is simple and straightforward and thus does not require strong leadership.) Participants were then asked to rate the substitutes for leadership that were present using the original substitutes for leadership scale (Kerr & Jermier, 1978). I went back to the original substitutes for leadership scale because I only manipulated one form of substitutes for leadership (nature of the task). I used all seven ‘nature of the task’ items from the original scale (see Appendix J for full measure), which were aggregated and used as the dependent variable.

Using a one-way ANOVA, I dummy coded the independent variable *substitutes for leadership* as either 1 — substitutes not present or 0 — substitutes present. Participants in the substitutes not present condition properly rated substitutes for leadership as less present (M =2.46, SD = 0.67), and participants in the substitutes present condition properly rated substitutes for leadership as more present (M = 3.61, SD = 0.66). The two conditions were also significantly different from each other $F(1, 111) = 83.73$, $p < .001$, $\eta 2 = .432$. Although these were different participants from the original study, these results suggest that the manipulation of *substitutes for leadership* was effective even though the initial manipulation check was unreliable.

Study results. Dummy codes were again used to create two dimensions of each independent variable: *substitutes for leadership* (1 = substitutes not present, 0 = substitutes present) and *leader’s self-efficacy* (1 = high leader’s self-efficacy, 0 = low leader’s self-efficacy). To test the effectiveness of measuring a leader’s perceived necessity, I used a 2

x 2 ANOVA where *perceived substitutes for leadership* and *leader's self-efficacy* were the independent variables and self-perceived necessity was the dependent variable. As anticipated, participants who lacked substitutes to their leadership perceived themselves as more necessary (M =5.75, SD = 1.12) than participants that perceived more substitutes to be present (M =5.19, SD = 1.33), $F(1, 289) = 17.913$, $p < .001$, $\eta 2 = .05$. Additionally, participants with higher leader's self-efficacy perceived themselves as more necessary (M = 5.90, SD = 1.34) than participants with low leader's self-efficacy (M = 5.03, SD = 1.46), $F(1, 289) = 35.355$, $p < .001$, $\eta 2 = .11$. See Table 16 for means, standard deviations, and correlation.

Participants who both lacked substitutes to their leadership and had high leader's self-efficacy (M = 6.11, SD = .90) perceived themselves as more necessary than participants who either lacked substitutes to their leadership or had high leader's self-efficacy (M = 5.53, SD = 1.21), $F(1, 218) = 4.06$, $p = .045$, $\eta 2 = .04$. Furthermore, participants who had both substitutes to their leadership and had low leader's self-efficacy (M = 4.68, SD = 1.58) perceived themselves as less necessary than participants that either lacked substitutes to their leadership or had high leader's self-efficacy (M = 5.53, SD = 1.21), $F(1, 207) = 9.632$, $p = .002$, $\eta 2 = .10$. Participants who lacked substitutes to their leadership but had low leader's self-efficacy (M = 5.38, SD = 1.34) did not perceive themselves as significantly more necessary than participants who had substitutes to their leadership present but had high leader's self-efficacy (M = 5.69, SD = 1.09), $F(1, 138) = 2.147$, $p = .145$, $\eta 2 = .01$. See Table 17 for all means and standard deviations by condition. See Table 18 for the 2 x 2 ANOVA Table.

Table 16: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations

	M	*SD*	(1)	(2)	(3)
(1) Substitutes for Leadership	1.48	.50	—		
(2) Leader's Efficacy	1.45	.50	-.04	—	
(3) Self-Perceived Necessity	5.18	1.00	.26**	-.36**	—

Note. N = 289. Substitutes for Leadership is coded 1 = substititutes not present, 0 = substitutes present. Leader's Efficacy is coded 1 = high efficacy, 0 = low efficacy.
** p < .01.

Table 17: Means and Standard Deviations by Condition

	Necessity	
	M	*SD*
Efficacy with No Substitutes	6.11	.90
No Efficacy with No Substitutes	5.38	1.34
Efficacy with Substitutes	5.69	1.09
No Efficacy with Substitutes	4.68	1.58

Note. N = 289. Necessity reflects self-perceptions of the participant's necessity.

Table 18: 2x2 ANOVA – Necessity (Self)

	df	*F*	*p*	η2
Substitutes for Leadership	1	17.913	.000	.05
Efficacy	1	35.355	.000	.11
Substitutes for Leadership x Efficacy	1	.902	.343	.003

Note. N = 289.

Discussion

Results from Study 3 give evidence that both substitutes for leadership and leader's self-efficacy are significant predictors of a leader's self-perceived necessity. As anticipated, both the lack of substitutes for leadership and high leader's self-efficacy together are the strongest predictors of high self-perceived necessity, and both the presence of substitutes and low leader's self-efficacy together are the strongest predictors of low self-perceived necessity. Having only one dimension of either substitutes for leadership or leader's self-efficacy present does significantly alter perceptions of self-perceived necessity, but not as strongly as when both dimensions are present. Therefore, all of the following studies will only use the dimensions of substitutes for leadership/high leader's self-efficacy (high necessity) or the presence of substitutes and low leader's self-efficacy (low necessity) to manipulate a leader's self-perceived necessity.

Study 4: Subordinates' Salience, Leader's Necessity, and Managers' Self-Interested and Granting Behaviors

The fourth study tested Hypotheses 4 and 5. Hypothesis 4 predicts that there is a positive relationship between a manager's self-perceived necessity and the self-interested behavior of a manager, and Hypothesis 5 predicts that there is a negative relationship between a manager's self-perceived necessity and the granting behavior of a manager. I used a similar adapted version of the UBG from Study 2B and manipulated the self-perceived necessity of the leader to examine how leaders' necessity affects the allocation behaviors of a manager.

Participants

Based on results from an a priori power analysis with a desired power level of .80, an alpha probability of .05, an effect size estimate of .20 and previous comprehension check failure rates, 200 mTurk participants were needed to reach the desired level of power for this study. Using the same estimate of total participants used in study 2B, I estimated I would need 400 total participants. Of the initial sample of 400 participants, 188 failed at least one of two comprehension checks and their responses were removed from all further analyses. Of the remaining 212 participants, 43% were female and the average age was 37.74 (*SD* = 11.84). Participants were all U.S. Citizens over the age of 18 and had an average of 14.97 years of full-time work experience (*SD* = 11.84). Ethnicities were self-reported as 75% White, 9% Black, 7% Asian, 5% Hispanic/Latino, and 2% other. Ten percent had a postgraduate degree, 40% had a bachelor's degree, 37% had some college experience, and 13% had at least a high school degree.

Design and Procedure

Participants were given similar UBG instructions given in Study 2B. In this study, self-perceptions of a leader's necessity were manipulated along a single dimension: *leader's self-perceived necessity*, and managers' allocations to self, willing to lie, and the difference in the allocation to the recipients were the dependent variables. The same descriptions of leader's necessity used in Study 3 were used in the manipulations for this study (see Appendix K for full wording of the study instructions). In the high leader's self-perceived necessity condition, participants were told that the allocation of bonus money required strong leadership and that they were chosen because of their strong ability to lead. In the

low leader's self-perceived necessity condition, participants were told that the allocation of bonus money did not require particularly strong leadership and that they were chosen despite lacking any particular qualifications to lead.

Participants were again informed of both pilot studies and told that their allocation of resources would be accepted or rejected based on the findings from the two pilot studies. After obtaining informed consent, participants were asked to engage in the UBG. Participants were informed that they were the allocators of a sum of money ($100,000) and were tasked with dividing the money between themselves and two other recipients. Participants were told that a subordinate would help with the logistics of the allocation decision, but no other information was given regarding their subordinate. Participants were informed that in this scenario the recipients would then decide whether to accept or reject the proposed allocation of money. If both recipients accepted, the money was divided as proposed, but if either recipient rejected the offer, all parties received nothing. Participants would again be informed that they could receive a bonus that was dependent on their allocation decision. In all conditions, the salient subordinate asks for more money to be allocated to the first of the two recipients. After the allocators proposed the distribution of money and chose how to represent the total pool of money to recipients, participants then completed a manipulation check—including a measure of the power of the salient other party—and a brief demographics survey. Within a week of survey completion, participants were informed if the distribution of funds was accepted, and the allocation bonus was paid if the allocation was acceptable.

Measures

Self-interested behavior. *S*elf-interested behavior was measured in the same two ways as in the previous studies: directly through the self-allocation of resources and indirectly through the potential misrepresentation of the pool of funds

Granting. Granting behavior was measured by the difference score of the first and second recipients. This measure should be a direct measure of a participant's willingness to grant a request from a subordinate.

Comprehension checks. Participants were asked questions with answers taken verbatim from the scenario. Specifically, participants were asked, "Please describe the allocation?" with possible responses being 1 (complex), 2 (simple and straightforward), or 3 (no information was given). Participants were also asked, "Regarding the scenario, please describe your leadership abilities relative to the task to allocate $100,000?" with possible responses being 1 (you were chosen because of your strong ability to lead), 2 (you were chosen despite lacking any particular ability to lead), or 3 (no information was given). I made an a priori decision to omit all subjects that failed either of the two comprehension checks.

Results

Manipulation check. To check the efficacy of the leader's self-perceived necessity manipulation, participants were asked to self-rate their perceived necessity with potential responses ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Using a one-way ANOVA, I dummy coded the independent variable *leader's self-perceived necessity* as either 1 — high leader's self-perceived necessity or 0 — low leader's self-perceived

necessity. The response to the question regarding the participants' self-perceived necessity was the dependent variable. Participants in the high leader's self-perceived necessity condition properly identified themselves more necessary (M = 6.01, SD = 0.90), and participants in the low leader's self-perceived necessity condition properly identified themselves less necessary (M = 4.97, SD = 1.40). The two conditions were also significantly different from each other $F(1, 212) = 7.268$, $p = .007$, $\eta 2 = .034$. These results indicate that the manipulation of leader's self-perceived necessity was effective.

Orthogonality check. To ensure that manipulations of an allocator's self-perceived necessity did not affect perceptions of the salient subordinates power, participants were asked to rate the power of the salient subordinate with potential responses ranging from 1 (no power) to 7 (a lot of power). Using a one-way ANOVA, I used the dummy codes for the independent variable *leader's self-perceived necessity*: 1 — high leader's self-perceived necessity or 0 — low leader's self-perceived necessity. The response to the question regarding the subordinate's power was the dependent variable. Participants in the high leader's self-perceived necessity condition properly identified the salient subordinate as no different in power (M = 2.81, SD = 1.42) to participants ratings of the salient subordinate's power in the low leader's self-perceived necessity condition (M = 2.91, SD = 1.56). The two conditions were also not significantly different from each other $F(1, 208) = .247$, $p = .623$, $\eta 2 = .001$. These results indicate that a leader's self-perceived necessity is not significantly related to perceptions of a subordinate's power.

Study results. To test the independent variable *leader's self-perceived necessity*, I used the dummy used in the previous manipulation check (1 = high leader's self-perceived necessity, 0 = low leader's self-perceived necessity). To test Hypothesis 4 — that there is

a positive relationship between a manager's self-perceived necessity and the self-interested behavior of a manager — I used one-way ANOVA's where *leader's self-perceived necessity* was the independent variable and allocation to self and the willingness to lie to each of the recipients were the dependent variables, respectively. Contrary to predictions, self-perceptions of a leader's necessity was not a significant predictor of allocating more to self $F(1, 212) = 1.03$, $p = .311$, $\eta 2 = .005$ or lying to the first $F(1, 212) = .33$, $p = .565$, $\eta 2 = .002$ or second recipient $F(1, 212) = .56$, $p = .453$, $\eta 2 = .003$. See Table 19 for all means, standard deviations, and correlations. These results do not support Hypothesis 4 and suggest that there may be no direct relationship between a self-perceived leader's necessity and the self-interested behaviors of a manager.

To test Hypothesis 5 — that there is a negative relationship between a manager's self-perceived necessity and the granting behavior of a manager — I used one-way ANOVA where *leader's necessity* was the independent variable and the difference score in the allocation between the first and second recipient was the dependent variable. Contrary to predictions, self-perceptions of a leader's necessity was not a significant predictor of allocating more to the first recipient $F(1, 212) = 1.23$, $p = .268$, $\eta 2 = .006$. See Table 19 for all means, standard deviations, and correlations. These results do not support Hypothesis 5 and suggest that there may be no direct relationship between a self-perceived leader's necessity and the granting behaviors of a manager. See Table 20 for all means and standard deviations by condition.

Table 19: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations

	M	*SD*	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
(1) Leader's Necessity	1.56	.50	—				
(2) Allocation (Self)	$45,682	$18,076	.07	—			
(3) Lie to Recipient 1	.51	.50	-.04	.54**	—		
(4) Lie to Recipient 2	.54	.50	-.05	.49**	.92**	—	
(5) Allocation Difference (R1 - R2)	$2,675	$5,365	-.07	-.02	.15*	.19**	—

Note. N = 209. Leader's Necessity is coded 1 = high leader's nedcessity, 0 = low leader's necessity.
* p < .05. ** p < .01.

Table 20: Means and Standard Deviations by Condition

	Allocation (Self)		Allocation (R1 - R2)		Lie (Recipient 1)		Lie (Recipient 2)	
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*
High Necessity	$44,147	$15,202	$3,121	$4,203	.53	.50	.56	.50
Low Necessity	$46,714	$20,044	$2,280	$6,214	.49	.50	.51	.50

Note. N = 212.

Discussion

Results from Study 4 do not support Hypothesis 4 nor Hypothesis 5 by failing to demonstrate that the self-perceived necessity of a leader influences a managers' self-interested behavior or granting behaviors, respectively. Although a leader's self- perceived necessity did not have a direct effect on self-interested nor granting behaviors, Hypotheses 6 and 7 propose leader's necessity as a moderating variable. In Study 5, I again test a leader's self-perceived necessity to better understand how self-perceptions of a leader's necessity may alter the relationship between subordinates' power and self-interested and/or granting behaviors shown in the first studies.

Study 5: Subordinates' Power, Leader's Necessity, and Managers' Self-Interested and Granting Behaviors

Studies 5 and 6 tested Hypotheses 6 and 7. Hypothesis 6 predicts that the negative relationship between the power of a subordinate and the self-interested behavior of a manager is moderated by a manager's self-perceived necessity. Hypothesis 7 predicts that the positive relationship between the power of a subordinate and the granting behavior of their manager's behavior is moderated by a manager's self-perceived necessity. I planned to use the same adapted version of the UBG used in Study 4, but also manipulate the power of a subordinate in addition to leader's necessity. Even though I did not find that a leader's self-perceived necessity significantly affected the dependent variables of interest in Study 4, I believed that a leader's self-perceived necessity might still interact with subordinate's power. Therefore, I continued with the study as planned. In this study, I used the manipulation of the self-perceived necessity of a leader from Study 4 and examined how a leader's self-perceived necessity affects the relationship between a subordinate's power and the allocation behaviors of a manager from Study 2b (see Appendix L for full wording of the study instructions).

Participants

Based on results from an a priori power analysis with a desired power level of .80, an alpha probability of .05, and an effect size estimate of .20, 400 mTurk participants were needed to reach the desired level of power for this study. To ensure full power for this more complex study, 1060 total mTurk participants were recruited. Of the initial sample of 1060 participants, 651 failed at least one of three comprehension checks and their responses were

removed from all further analyses. Of the remaining 409 participants, 49% were female and the average age was 35.5 (*SD* = 10.94). Participants were all U.S. citizens over the age of 18 and had an average of 13.5 years of full-time work experience (*SD* = 12.0). Ethnicities were self-reported as 77% White, 9% Asian, 7% Black, 5% Hispanic/Latino, and 3% other. Fourteen percent had a postgraduate degree, 36% had a bachelor's degree, 38% had some college experience, and 11% had a high school degree.

Design and Procedure

After obtaining informed consent, participants were given the same general UBG instructions given in Study 4. Participants were again assigned to the manager role and randomly placed into one of four conditions. Participants were randomly placed into one of four conditions by manipulating two dimensions (2 x 2 design): *subordinate's power* (using the same manipulation from Study 2b) and *leader's self-perceived necessity* (using the same manipulation from Study 4). Again, managers' allocation decisions and willingness to lie to recipients were the dependent variables. In the high subordinate's power conditions, participants read that one of their higher paid and more influential subordinates suggested that they would appreciate it if the first of the two recipients received more of the pool of available money. In the low subordinate's power conditions, participants read that one of their lower paid and less influential subordinates suggested that would appreciate it if the first of the two recipients received more of the pool of available money. In the high leader's self-perceived necessity conditions, participants read that the allocation of bonus money required strong leadership and that they were chosen because of their strong ability to lead. In the low leader's self-perceived necessity

conditions, participants read that the allocation of bonus money did not require particularly strong leadership and that they were chosen despite lacking any particular qualifications to lead. The remainder of Study 5 proceeded as described in Study 4.

Measures

Self-interested behavior. Self-interested behavior was measured in the same two ways as in the previous studies: directly through the self-allocation of resources and indirectly through the potential misrepresentation of the pool of funds

Granting. Granting behavior was measured by the difference score in the allocations given to the first and second recipients. This measure should be a direct measure of a participant's willingness to grant a request from a subordinate.

Comprehension checks. Due to the complexity of the study design, there were three comprehension check questions in this study, which resulted in higher failure rates than previous studies. All answers to the comprehension questions were taken verbatim from the scenario. First, participants were asked, "Please describe the allocation?" with possible responses being 1 (complex), 2 (simple and straightforward), or 3 (no information was given). Participants were also asked, "Regarding the scenario, please describe your leadership abilities relative to the task to allocate $100,000?" with possible responses being 1 (you were chosen because of your strong ability to lead), 2 (you were chosen despite lacking any particular ability to lead), or 3 (no information was given). Finally, participants were asked to, "Please describe your subordinate that is helping you with the logistics of the allocation" with possible responses being 1 (more influential and higher paid), 2 (less influential and lesser paid), or 3 (no information was given). I made an a priori decision to

omit all subjects that failed any of the three comprehension checks.

Results

Manipulation check. To check the efficacy of the subordinate's power manipulation, participants were again asked to rate the power of the salient subordinate with potential responses ranging from 1 (no power) to 7 (a lot of power). Using a one-way ANOVA, I dummy coded the independent variable *subordinate's power* as either 1 — high-power subordinate or 0 — low-power subordinate. The response to the question regarding the subordinate's power was the dependent variable. Participants in the high-power subordinate condition properly identified the salient subordinate as higher in power (M = 4.99, SD = 0.87), and participants in the low-power subordinate condition properly identified the salient subordinate as lower in power (M = 3.26, SD = 1.16). The two conditions were also significantly different from each other $F(1, 402) = 279.28$, $p < .001$, $\eta 2 = .411$. These results indicate that the manipulation of subordinate's power was effective.

To check the efficacy of the leader's self-perceived necessity manipulation, participants were asked to self-rate their perceived necessity with potential responses ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Using a one-way ANOVA, I dummy coded the independent variable *leader's self-perceived necessity* as either 1 — high leader's self-perceived necessity or 0 — low leader's self-perceived necessity. The response to the question regarding the participants' self-perceived necessity was the dependent variable. Participants in the high leader's self-perceived necessity condition properly identified themselves more necessary (M = 5.41, SD = 0.84), and participants in the low leader's self-

perceived necessity condition properly identified themselves less necessary (M = 4.85, SD = 1.01). The two conditions were also significantly different from each other $F(1, 329) = 29.55$, $p < .001$, $\eta 2 = .083$. These results indicate that the manipulation of leader's self-perceived necessity was effective.

Study results. Dummy codes from the previous manipulation checks were used for each independent variable: *subordinate's power* (1 = high subordinate's power, 0 = low subordinate's power) and *leader's self-perceived necessity* (1 = high leader's self-perceived necessity, 0 = low leader's self-perceived necessity). To test Hypothesis 6 — that the negative relationship between the power of a subordinate and the self-interested behavior of a manager is moderated by a manager's self-perceived necessity — I used a 2 x 2 ANOVA where *subordinate's power* and *leader's self-perceived necessity* were the independent variables and allocation to self and willingness to lie to each recipient were the dependent variables, respectively. Contrary to expectations, a leader's self-perceived necessity did not moderate the relationship between a subordinate's power and participant's allocations to recipients, $F(1, 409) = 1.65$, $p = .199$, $\eta 2 = .004$, nor lying to the first $F(1, 404) = 2.69$, $p = .102$, $\eta 2 < .007$ or second recipient $F(1, 404) = 1.92$, $p = .185$, $\eta 2 < .005$. See Table 21 for all means, standard deviations, and correlations. These results do not support Hypothesis 6 and suggest that there may be no relationship between a leader's self-perceived necessity, subordinate's power, and the self-interested behavior of a manager.

To test Hypothesis 7 — that the positive relationship between the power of a subordinate and the granting behavior of their manager's behavior is moderated by a manager's self-perceived necessity — dummy codes for *subordinate's power* (1 = high

Table 21: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations

	M	*SD*	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
(1) Subordinate's Power	1.54	.50	—					
(2) Leader's Necessity	1.48	.50	-.04	—				
(3) Allocation (Self)	$43,992	$17,698	.04	.02	—			
(4) Lie to Recipient 1	.51	.50	-.01	.06	.51**	—		
(5) Lie to Recipient 2	.51	.50	-.01	.06	.51**	1.00**	—	
(6) Allocation Difference (R1 - R2)	$3,971	$7,414	-.22**	-.01	-.17**	-.001	-.001	—

Note. N = 473. Subordinate's power is coded 1 = high subordinate's power, 0 = low subordinate's power. Leader's Necessity is coded 1 = high leader's nedcessity, 0 = low leader's necessity.
** $p < .01$.

subordinate's power, 0 = low subordinate's power) and *leader's self-perceived necessity* (1 = high leader's self-perceived necessity, 0 = low leader's self-perceived necessity) were again used. I used a 2 x 2 ANOVA where *subordinate's power* and *leader's self-perceived necessity* were the independent variables and the difference between the allocations to the first and second recipient was the dependent variable. Contrary to prediction, a leader's self-perceived necessity did not moderate the relationship between a subordinate's power and granting a subordinate's request, $F(1, 409) = 1.836$, $p = .176$, $\eta 2 = .005$. See Table 21 for all means, standard deviations, and correlations. Although these results do not support Hypothesis 7, this study does provide further evidence in support of Hypothesis 3 in that participants were significantly more likely to grant a high-power subordinate's request (M = \$5,599, SD = \$8,646) than a low-power subordinate's request (M = \$2,463, SD = \$5,569), $F(1, 190) = 19.153$, $p < .001$, $\eta 2 = .045$. As in Study 2B, there was no main effect for subordinate's power on a leader's self-interested behavior. See Table 22 for all means and standard deviations by condition. See Table 23, 24, and 25 for 2 x 2 ANOVA tables.

Table 22: Means and Standard Deviations by Condition

	Allocation (Self)		Allocation (R1 - R2)		Lie (Recipient 1)		Lie (Recipient 2)	
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*
High Power Sub / High Necessity	$44,143	$18,799	$5,181	$7,509	.53	.50	.53	.50
High Power Sub / Low Necessity	$43,260	$18,604	$6,017	$9,783	.50	.50	.50	.50
Low Power Sub / High Necessity	$43,246	$16,270	$3,016	$5,888	.45	.50	.45	.50
Low Power Sub / Low Necessity	$47,000	$19,178	$1,910	$5,251	.58	.50	.58	.50

Note. $N = 409$.

Table 23: 2x2 ANOVA – Allocation (Self)

	df	*F*	*p*	η2
Subordinate's Power	1	.622	.431	.002
Leader's Necessity	1	.633	.427	.002
Subordinate's Power X Leader's Necessity	1	1.652	.199	.004

Note. $N = 409$.

Table 24: 2x2 ANOVA – Granting

	df	*F*	*p*	η2
Subordinate's Power	1	19.153	.000	.045
Leader's Necessity	1	.036	.851	.000
Subordinate's Power X Leader's Necessity	1	1.836	.176	.005

Note. $N = 409$.

Table 25: 2x2 ANOVA – Willingness to Lie

	df	*F*	*p*	η2
Subordinate's Power	1	.005	.946	.000
Leader's Necessity	1	.973	.325	.002
Subordinate's Power X Leader's Necessity	1	2.689	.102	.007

Note. $N = 409$.

Discussion

Results from Study 5 do not support Hypothesis 6 or Hypothesis 7 by failing to demonstrate that a leader's self-perceived necessity moderates the relationship between subordinates' power and self-interested or granting behavior, respectively. Although I was unable to show a moderating effect of leader's self-perceived necessity, I did find additional support for Hypothesis 3 that there is a negative relationship between a subordinate's power and a leader's willingness to grant a request. In Study 6, I do one final test on the relationship between a leader's self-perceived necessity, a subordinate's power, and self-interested behaviors. In the final study, I amended the design from two recipients back to one. The studies with one recipient showed some evidence for a positive relationship between subordinates' power and self-interested behaviors, but that effect was not found when there were two recipients. I reverted to one recipient in the design of Study 6 to explore the potential moderating effect of a leader's necessity in a slightly different context from the previous two studies.

Study 6: Subordinates' Power, Leader's Necessity, and Managers' Self-Interested Behaviors

In Study 6, I used survey methodology to pose hypothetical questions based on real experiences with an employee and an actual organizational task to explore Hypothesis 6.

Participants

Participants for this study were students obtaining a Professional MBA at the University of Utah. This sample provided a pool of individuals with greater managerial

experience. I used that experience in hopes of enhancing the external validity of my studies. The power for this study was contingent on the enrollment of the classes and the willingness of the students to participate. Out of 105 possible PMBA students, 17 did not participate. On the day the survey was administered, six students were absent, nine students arrived too late to participate, and seven students chose not to participate in the study. Of the remaining 83 participants, 29% were female and the average age was 30.17 (*SD* = 4.59). Participants had an average of 7.15 years of full-time work experience (*SD* = 4.33). Ethnicities were self-reported as 89% White, 4% Asian, 4% Hispanic/Latino, and 3% other. All participants had at least obtained a bachelor's degree.

Design and Procedure

An online survey was administered in three sections of PMBA students enrolled in a leadership course and taken the beginning of the 3rd week of classes. After obtaining consent, respondents were placed into one of the four conditions present in Study 5 by manipulating two dimensions (2 x 2 design): *subordinate's power* and *leader's self-perceived necessity*. In the high subordinate's power condition, participants were asked to respond to questions in regard to one of their previous or current higher paid and more influential subordinates. In the low subordinate's power condition, participants were asked to respond to questions in regards to one of their previous or current lower paid and less influential subordinates. In the high leader's self-perceived necessity condition, participants were asked to think of a previous or current context where there was great need for them to actively manage their employee. In the low leader's self-perceived necessity condition, participants were asked to think of a previous or current context where there was

little need for them to actively manage their employee.

In all conditions, participants were asked a series of open-ended questions in regards to the high-/low-power employee in a high/low leader self-perceived necessity context. Because not all PMBA students have previous leadership experience, at the outset of the study, participants were asked if they have had previous organizational leadership experience. If participants answered negatively, they were placed in the same conditions listed above but asked to take the perspective of the subordinate and assess a previous manager. These data from a subordinate's perspective were not used for purposes of this study, but will be used in a future project. If participants answered positively, the study proceeded as delineated (see Appendix M for full wording of the study instructions).

These questions were created to explore what, I believe, are the mechanisms that drive the proposed effects in the present research. Specifically, participants were asked (1) how would you respond if this employee told you that they would like to perform this task differently than you have instructed them? (2) How would you respond if the employee asked you to radically change the way the task is performed even if you see little value in the request? (3) How would you respond if the employee asked you to radically change the way the task is performed assuming the task would be performed more efficiently but it might reflect negatively on you? (4) How would you respond if the employee asked you to radically change the way the task is performed assuming the task would be performed less efficiently but it might reflect positively on you? (5) If your boss approached you and commended you on your work on this task, how likely would you be to pass the credit on to this employee?

Participants were then asked to participate, as the allocator (or salient subordinate in

the cases of those with no previous leadership experience), in the UBG with the employee (or manager) from the initial exercise serving as the hypothetical salient other. I had planned to use the same UBG from Studies 4 and 5, but due to the lack of significant findings from Studies 4 and 5, I chose to alter the planned design and used the one-recipient UBG design from Study 2A. Because the number of recipients (one versus two) differentially affected how subordinate's power affected self-interested behaviors in Studies 2A and 2B, I believed that the number of recipients (one or two) might also affect the way leader's necessity affects self-interested behaviors. Because there is only one recipient and a subordinate makes a request in all conditions in this study, self-interested behavior (allocation to self and lying) is the only dependent variable of interest. After completing the UBG, participants completed a brief demographics survey.

Measures

Self-interested behavior. *S*elf-interested behavior was measured in the same two ways as in the previous studies: directly through the self-allocation of resources and indirectly through the potential misrepresentation of the pool of funds

Comprehension check. The comprehension check questions were removed from this study due to time constraints.

Results

Manipulation check. The manipulation check questions were also removed from this study due to time constraints.

Study results. To qualitatively explore Hypothesis 6 — that the negative relationship

between the power of a subordinate and the self-interested behavior of a manager is moderated by a manager's self-perceived necessity — I generally reviewed the open-ended responses provided in the survey. Likely because the participants were in a class about leadership, the responses were quite homogeneous across conditions. Most participants made some form of claim that they would pursue the best interests of the subordinate and/or the company before their own self-interests. Whereas this does not provide evidence in support of Hypothesis 6, these results do indicate some evidence that participants shared a fairly homogenous prototype of leadership behavior as evidenced through the consistent expression of aversion to self-interested behavior. Asking participants to envision a leadership role appears to result in participants consistently conveying self-sacrifice in service of the greater good.

To further test Hypothesis 6, I used a 2 x 2 ANOVA where *subordinate's power* and *leader's self-perceived necessity* were the independent variables and allocation to self and willingness to lie to the recipient were the dependent variables, respectively. Contrary to expectations, a leader's self-perceived necessity did not moderate the relationship between a subordinate's power and participant's allocations to recipients, $F(1, 79) = .772$, $p = .382$, $\eta 2 = .01$ nor lying to the recipient $F(1, 79) = .047$, $p = .688$, $\eta 2 = .002$. See Table 26 for all means, standard deviations, and correlations. These results do not support Hypothesis 6 and again suggest that there may be no relationship between a leader's necessity, a subordinate's power, and the self-interested behavior of a manager.

Although these results do not support Hypothesis 6, these results do provide further evidence in support of Hypothesis 2. Participants with a high-power subordinate salient allocated less to themselves (M = \$47,468, SD = \$7,350) than participants with a low-

power subordinate salient (M = \$52,061, SD = \$8,514), $F(1, 41) = 6.345$, $p = .014$, $\eta 2 = .078$. Furthermore, participants with a high-power subordinate salient lied marginally less to recipients ($M = .05$, $SD = .15$) than participants with a low-power subordinate salient ($M = .18$, $SD = .40$), $F(1, 41) = 3.725$, $p = .057$, $\eta 2 = .047$. See Table 27 for all means and standard deviations by condition. See Table 28 and 29 for 2 x 2 ANOVA tables.

Discussion

Results from Study 6 do not support Hypothesis 6 by failing to demonstrate that a leader's self-perceived necessity moderates the relationship between subordinates' power and self-interested behavior. Although I was unable to show a moderating effect of leader's self-perceived necessity, I did find additional support for Hypothesis 2 that there is a negative relationship between a subordinate's power and a leader's self-interested behaviors. Interestingly, across conditions, participants expressed a mostly universal distaste for demonstrating self-interested behavior in the qualitative responses, yet there was still evidence of more self-interested behavior when a low-power subordinate was salient.

Because this study asks participants to envision a real person as their salient subordinate, this study provides a small amount of additional external validity. One limitation of this study was the smaller sample size due to the limited number of students enrolled in the class. Whereas this small sample size may have impeded some significant findings regarding the moderating effect of a leader's self-perceived necessity, the fact that the results indicate further support of the relationship between subordinate's power and self-interested behavior is promising.

Table 26: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations

	M	*SD*	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(1) Subordinate's Power	1.48	.50	—			
(2) Leader's Necessity	1.47	.50	-.04	—		
(3) Allocation (Self)	$49,696	$8,281	.27*	-.02	—	
(4) Lie to Recipient	1.89	.32	-.21	.10	-.35**	—

Note. N = 473. Subordinate's power is coded 1 = high subordinate's power, 0 = low subordinate's power. Leader's Necessity is coded 1 = high leader's nedcessity, 0 = low leader's necessity.
* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

Table 27: Means and Standard Deviations by Condition

	Allocation (Self)		Lie	
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*
High Power Sub / High Necessity	$48,409	$5,431	.09	.29
High Power Sub / Low Necessity	$46,526	$9,270	.00	.00
Low Power Sub / High Necessity	$51,400	$6,134	.20	.41
Low Power Sub / Low Necessity	$52,722	$10,894	.17	.38

Note. N = 79.

Table 28: 2x2 ANOVA – Allocation (Self)

	df	*F*	*p*	η2
Subordinate's Power	1	6.345	.014	.078
Leader's Necessity	1	.024	.878	.000
Subordinate's Power X Leader's Necessity	1	.772	.382	.01

Note. N = 79.

Table 29: 2x2 ANOVA – Willingness to Lie

	df	*F*	*p*	η2
Subordinate's Power	1	3.725	.057	.047
Leader's Necessity	1	.057	.387	.01
Subordinate's Power X Leader's Necessity	1	.047	.688	.002

Note. N = 79.

CHAPTER 3

GENERAL DISCUSSION

In this dissertation, I explored how a subordinate's attributes can influence a leader's behaviors. More specifically, I explored how subordinates' power can influence a leader's self-interest and willingness to grant requests, as well as how a leader's self-perceived necessity may affect those behaviors. The theoretical premise underlying my argument is that individuals have prototypes of appropriate leader behaviors (Hogg, 2001a), and managers hope to be seen as prototypical (Hogg, 1993) particularly when attempting to maintain authority over valuable followers (Berscheid & Reis, 1998; DeRue & Ashford, 2010). Across a series of seven studies, I found mixed but supportive evidence that the power of a subordinate can affect both self-interested and granting behaviors.

Study Overview

In Study 1, leaders with a subordinate salient made less self-interested allocations and lied to recipients less about those allocations than leaders with either no one or other non-subordinates present. In Studies 2a and 6, leaders with a high-power subordinate salient made less self-interested allocations than leaders with a low-power subordinate salient. In Studies 2b and 5, leaders with a high-power subordinate present were more willing to grant

the subordinate's request than leaders with a low-power subordinate present. In Study 3, both leaders' self-perceived efficacy and the presence of substitutes for leadership were shown to be important factors in determining a leader's necessity. However, in Study 4, I did not find a significant relationship between a leader's self-perceived necessity and leaders' behaviors, nor did I find a moderating effect of leaders' self-perceived necessity in Studies 5 or 6. Although there were some mixed results, the data of the present research demonstrate that the attributes of followers can shape their leaders' behaviors.

My findings highlight a more accurate valuation of followers in an organization by refuting the idea that leaders solely shape an organization by being autonomous agents that influence followers (Hogg, 2010). By "reversing the lens" (Shamir, 2007), the present research demonstrates that followers — specifically followers in a powerful role — share some responsibility in shaping an organization by acting as an agent of influence that affects leaders' behaviors. The present findings do not inherently diminish the importance of leaders in organizations, but do have significant implications on the importance of the upward influence of followers in organizations (Staw, 2016), as well as managerial implications.

Theoretical Contributions

The findings in the present research contribute to several literatures including those on followership, power in hierarchies, and leadership. In the following sections, I will discuss the theoretical contributions made in these three areas. Whereas past research on the role that leaders play in shaping organizations has been rich and informative (see Avolio et al., 2009 for a review), the present research emphasizes the growing importance of exploring

followers' role in shaping organizations.

Followership and the Role of Followers

The current research makes a contribution to the followership literature (Uhl-Bien et al., 2014) by exploring how followers' characteristics affect the behavior of leaders in formal positions of authority. Current research investigating followership focuses mostly on either a follower's actions (Bligh, 2011; DeRue & Ashford, 2010; Howell & Shamir, 2005; Shamir, 2007; Uhl-Bien et al., 2014,) or how a follower's attributes affect their own behavior (Carsten et al., 2010; Kohles, et al., 2012; Sy, 2010). The present research provides a better understanding of how followers' attributes can affect those holding formal positions of authority. This is a contribution because it could alter the current understanding of the dynamic relationship between leaders and followers. By establishing that followers can influence leaders' behaviors, organizations can better understand how leaders' attitudes and behaviors are formed and enacted and how employees can be more effectively understood and utilized in organizations. By establishing that a follower's attributes can affect a leader's behaviors, the current boundaries of followership research are expanded.

The present research also establishes that followers (i.e., subordinates) have a unique and influential role in organizations. The evidence indicates that the influence of a subordinate can go beyond simple social normative influence from the salience of another in an organization (Turner, 1991; Turner et al., 1987). The salience of a subordinate engages a manager's prototypes for a leader (Berscheid & Reis, 1998; Epitropaki & Martin, 2004; Gioia & Sims, 1985; Tyler, 2006) resulting in behavior that corresponds more closely with those prototypes. These findings are particularly important because they reveal that

followers in an organization may be more influential than what is currently proposed in the leadership literature (Avolio et al., 2009; Morgeson et al., 2009). Furthermore, because a follower's attributes can influence the behavior of a leader, one must explore both a leader and a follower — not simply a leader in isolation — to truly understand a leader's actions and behaviors.

Power Across Levels of Hierarchy

Another contribution this dissertation makes is to the literature on power across hierarchical levels in organizations that explores the effect of asymmetrical control of organizational resources (Magee & Galinsky, 2008). The present research explores how differential power at a lower level of a hierarchy (i.e., followers) can affect the behaviors of an individual at a higher level in the same hierarchy (i.e., leader/manager). Because the majority of organizational leadership exists formally in a hierarchy (Avolio et al., 2009; Magee & Galinsky, 2008), a better understanding of the nature and extent of influences across levels of hierarchy will serve to better understand decisions made in organizations. By demonstrating the upward hierarchical influence of follower's on their leaders, I was able to uncover a previously unexplored phenomenon that further illuminates the dynamic influences that affect leaders' actions in an organizational hierarchy.

This research establishes empirical evidence that differences in power amongst subordinates differentially affects how a leader, with higher formal power than all subordinates, responds to those subordinates. This is a unique perspective on how power interacts within levels of a hierarchy and further informs how power influences individuals across hierarchical levels. Specifically, high-power subordinates can lead managers to

engage in less self-interested behaviors in certain contexts. As self-interest on the part of a leader is often at odds with the self-interest of an organization, organizations could potentially attenuate a leader's self-interested tendencies by making subordinates more salient to their managers. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that if organizations were to specifically make high-power subordinates more salient to managers, then those manager's self-interested tendencies may be further attenuated.

Leadership

The current research provides insight into the dynamic relationship between leaders and followers. The present research further informs the process by which leaders claim power and followers grant power (DeRue & Ashford, 2010). In order to claim power, leaders may need to be susceptible to the influence of their followers to some degree. Powerful followers may be less inclined to grant power to leaders, and leaders may perceive a need to be more susceptible to a powerful follower's influence in order to claim or maintain power. If a leader holds a formal position of power (e.g., manager), the formal position itself is a claim on authority. These behavioral changes are made in an attempt to be granted power or maintain the granting of power from their followers.

The evidence demonstrates that powerful followers can exert particularly strong influence on their leader's behaviors, and followers assessed as low-power may be devalued and be less likely to influence their leaders (Kipnis, 1976; Magee & Smith, 2013). In the present research, leaders are shown to be particularly influenced by powerful followers because of a closer perceived level of power as compared to followers low in power. Specifically, managers were more willing to grant a request made by a high-power

subordinate than a low-power subordinate. Even though the power of a subordinate should have little or no bearing on the legitimacy of the request, leaders were still more willing to grant high-power subordinate's requests. Leaders may see powerful followers as more integral and less socially distant (Magee & Smith, 2013), which leads them to value powerful follower's contribution and influence more than less powerful followers.

Leaders are given the authority to make decisions on behalf of the organizations, and decisions made to maintain authority instead of pursuing an organizations interests could have deleterious organizational consequences. The willingness to grant high-power subordinates' requests could simply be a utilitarian strategy to maintain the influence of subordinates that are perceived as more valuable (Berscheid & Reis, 1998). Organizationally speaking, the fact that the attributes of a follower can bias the granting of a request is potentially disturbing — particularly when those requests affect others in the organization.

Alternately, efforts to maintain the allegiance of valuable subordinates could actually benefit an organization so long as those efforts are not in direct conflict with the goals of an organization. Because leadership is a dynamic process (DeRue & Ashford, 2010), some claims made by subordinates need to be granted to maintain a subordinate's support and continued allegiance. One could argue that higher power subordinates are more valuable and have more organizational needs. Therefore, it is possible that high-power subordinates should have their requests granted more frequently than lower power subordinates. Even though this is possible, by being more aware of the tendency to grant higher power subordinate's request, leaders could ensure that they appropriately satisfy the needs of both their higher power subordinates and their lower power subordinates.

Limitations and Future Directions

As with all research, these studies have limitations that must be recognized and explored to best understand the overall results. One of the central limitations of this research is the unsuccessful attempts to demonstrate the effects a leader's self-perceived necessity. The leadership literature, in general, has made some progress in accepting the fallacy of the "romance of leadership" (Meindl et al., 1985) and some scholars have begun constructing frameworks around the effect of leaders on followers and the situations in which leaders matter (Hackman & Wageman, 2004). Additionally, some literature has explored the effects of ineffective leadership because substitutes for leadership exist (Howell, Bowen, Dorfman, Kerr, & Podsakoff, 1990; Howell & Dorfman, 1981; Howell, Dorfman, & Kerr, 1986; Podsakoff & MacKenzie, 1997; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Ahearne, & Bommer, 1995). Yet the leadership literature has yet to fully explore the implications of a leader that lacks necessity due either to the situation (not the right context) or their abilities (not the right skills). Organizations have a general proclivity towards hierarchy (Magee & Galinsky, 2008), but hierarchy and/or leadership must be situationally needed to be effective (Hackman & Wageman, 2004).

The present research attempted to establish the effects of a leader's self-perceived necessity on that leader's behaviors. I predicted that changes in a leader's self-perceived necessity would alter the demonstrated positive relationships between a subordinate's power and self-interested behavior (Hypothesis 6) and granting a subordinate's request (Hypothesis 7), respectively. Whereas I failed to reliably find evidence for this effect (Studies 4-6), I still believe that a leader's necessity is an important and potentially fruitful area of inquiry. Because a formal authority figure does not cease to be a leader — at least

formally — simply because that leader is not needed, it is important to understand how a leader can be effective even when perceived as less necessary.

Studies 3, 4, 5, and 6 all successfully manipulated a participant's self-perceived necessity. I posited that less self-perceived necessity would alter the relationship between subordinate's power and a leader's behaviors, but it is possible, and even likely, that a relative reduction in self-perceived necessity is insufficient. Throughout all studies that manipulated a leader's self-perceived necessity, those in the low-necessity conditions never had a mean below the midpoint (3.5 on a 7-point scale). In other words, whereas participants in the low-necessity conditions did show a relative decrease in self-perceived necessity, all participants still perceived themselves as at least somewhat necessary. It is evident that a relative decrease in self-perceived necessity does not affect the positive relationship between a subordinate's power and the behaviors of a leader, but it is highly plausible that perceiving oneself as unnecessary — as opposed to less necessary — may demonstrate the proposed effect. Future research should focus on the difference between necessary and unnecessary leaders as opposed to more and less necessary leaders.

Because of the online and experimental nature of this dissertation, the internal validity of the studies is strong, but the external validity suffered. Although several effects were replicated across studies and Study 6 did replicate the findings from Study 2 using a real individual in a hypothetical scenario, the studies would benefit from increased external validity. The findings of the studies would be bolstered by experimentally manipulating groups in the lab. Furthermore, performing a quasi-experiment or survey research using real teams in organizations would greatly enhance the external validity of the findings. Future studies should attempt to explore different methods to test the findings of this

dissertation in actual groups.

Another limitation of this dissertation was the narrow focus of both the attributes of a follower (subordinates' power) and the behaviors of a leader (self-interested and granting behaviors). Although a subordinate's power is an important attribute to understand, there are many more follower attributes (Uhl-Bien et al., 2014) and many of these attributes could potentially alter a leader's behaviors. The focus on a specific attribute was necessary for the scope of this dissertation, but followership research would benefit from understanding how other follower attributes affect the behaviors of their leader's. Likewise, I was limited in the number of leader behaviors included in the studies. I was able to demonstrate several leaders' behaviors — allocations, lying, and granting requests — that were affected by subordinate's power, but there are many additional leader behaviors (Morgeson et al., 2009), and many, if not all, could be influenced by a subordinate's attributes. Exploring other leader's behaviors relative to a follower's attributes would be another great opportunity for future research.

Finally, there were some inconsistencies in the findings for Hypothesis 2 that predict that there is a negative relationship between the power of a subordinate and the self-interested behavior of a manager. Studies 2 and 6 demonstrated the negative relationship, but Studies 4 and 5 did not demonstrate the negative relationship. The key difference between these studies was the number of recipients. Studies 2 and 6 had one recipient, and Studies 4 and 5 had two recipients. It is possible that more recipients invokes group-level normative behavior (Pepitone, 1976) and having only one recipient invokes individual-level normative behavior (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Sherif, 1936). Because the implications of violating group- and individual-level norms can differ (Batson et al., 2002; Feldman,

1984; Triandis, 1994), participants may have altered their behavior based on the perception that their behavior was either individual- or group-oriented. By adding an additional recipient, the allocation decision could have shifted the decision schema from an individually-based decision between a dyad, to a group-based decision between three individuals. Although no research has yet demonstrated a link between number of participants and equity norms, it is also possible that having more than one recipient makes equity norms (Carrell & Dittrich, 1978) more salient and therefore, having more than one recipient attenuates self-interested behavior. Regardless of the actual mechanism — which would be an interesting topic for future research — it seems clear that the context of the allocation can alter the relationship between a subordinate's power and a leader's self-interested behavior. Future studies should focus on different contexts and how those contexts might influence a leader's susceptibility to a follower's influence.

Practical Implications

Groups perform better when knowledge and expertise is identified and transferred within a group (Bonner & Baumann, 2012), but powerful individuals (e.g., leaders) have been shown to disregard the advice of experts (Tost, 2011). The current research demonstrates that high-power followers have a differential influence on leaders as compared to low-power followers. That a leader could be influenced solely by power has potentially troubling implications on knowledge transfer in groups. Organizations often hire knowledgeable individuals to enhance the organizational performance, but if managers are unwilling or unable to identify and transfer that knowledge, the value of the expertise is diminished (Bonner & Baumann, 2012). A powerful follower does not necessarily have

more valuable input, but they were shown to be more influential because of their power. Managers should be aware that their decisions may be biased in favor of their powerful followers, which might lead to suboptimal decisions.

Conclusion

Most of the organizational leadership literature focuses on the vital roles that leaders play in an organization (Meindl et al., 1985; Morgeson et al., 2009; Sy, 2010). The core discussions center on the best forms of leadership (Avolio et al., 2009; DeRue & Ashford, 2010; Judge & Piccolo, 2004; Van Knippenberg & Sitkin, 2013) or the behaviors in which effective leaders engage (Hackman & Wageman, 2004; Morgeson et al., 2009). The current research demonstrates that one-sided views of the importance of leadership may be obfuscating the true value of employees/followers in an organization. Followers have a distinct relationship with their leaders and can have significant effect on their leaders' behaviors. The existence of social norms are well established in the organizational literature (Cialdini, Kallgren, & Reno, 1991), but subordinates appear to motivate a unique form of normative behavior in their leaders. The mere presence of a follower inhibits self-interested behavior, and as the power of that follower increases, leaders are more likely to grant their requests, even when the nature of the request is the same.

This lends credence to the supposition that there is some form of universal normative leader prototype that motivates leaders to appear more like "a leader" when a subordinate is salient. By curbing self-interested behaviors when a subordinate is salient, leaders can present on image of fairness and equity that appears to be universally associated with a leader. Whereas engaging in self-interested behavior in the presence of a follower may not

directly harm the follower, leaders appear to perform some form of mental calculus regarding violation of this apparent "leader norm." Leaders seem to determine that the indirect costs of violating this "leader norm" would be more costly than the direct benefits of self-interested behavior.

Leaders are also more likely to grant requests from their higher power subordinates. Whereas this statement may appear obvious at first, I believe most leaders would also argue that a good idea would be recognized no matter the source in the organization. Instead, leaders appear to give undue weight to high-power subordinates and less weight to low-power subordinates – regardless of the content of the request. This means leaders could be discounting the contributions of their lower power followers and over-valuing the contributions of their high-power follower, but it is difficult to determine if this does more harm than good in organizations. High-power followers may also provide more benefit to both the leader and the organization. Whereas the willingness to grant higher power subordinates' requests may come at the cost of lower power subordinates, it may also ensure the continued commitment of these potentially higher value followers.

Regardless, because followers can directly alter the way in which a leader behaves, each employee could have a significant impact on the effectiveness of leaders in organizations. Each employee should be considered as an influential agent of a leaders' behavior and hired and managed accordingly.

APPENDIX A

STUDY 1 – INSTRUCTIONS

General Instructions

Please read the following scenario and then engage in a brief decision-making exercise. Read the scenario carefully because you may receive a monetary bonus depending on your performance in addition to your base compensation for this study.

5 Conditions

Control

Imagine that you are a manager at a Fortune 500 company. You have been asked to allocate a $100,000 bonus between yourself and another manager. As the other manager is currently unaware of the total amount of money to be allocated, you will have the opportunity to communicate both the total amount of bonus money and how much money was allocated to both yourself (Allocator) and the other manager (Recipient).

The other manager gets no say in the bonus allocation, but if the other manager chooses to reject your allocation for any reason, neither of you receive a bonus at this time.

Conditions (wording differences across conditions are indicated by italics)

Imagine that you are a manager at a Fortune 500 company. You have been asked to allocate an $100,000 bonus between yourself and another manager. As the other manager is currently unaware of the total amount of money to be allocated, you will have the opportunity to communicate both the total amount of bonus money and how much money was allocated to both yourself (Allocator) and the other manager (Recipient).

A *subordinate of one of your direct subordinates (SS1) / direct subordinate (S1) / subordinate of one of your colleagues (S9) / colleague of yours at work (Manager)* at work has been assigned to help you with the logistics, but you get final say over the allocation decision. The *subordinate of your direct subordinate / direct subordinate / subordinate of one of your colleagues / colleague of yours* has limited input regarding the allocation decision.

The other manager gets no say in the bonus allocation, but if the other manager chooses to reject your allocation for any reason, neither of you receive a bonus at this time.

Additional Instructions

A pilot study has been conducted that asked participants to imagine that they were the other manager in the above scenario. In the pilot study, participants were given information about different allocations and different total bonus allocation amounts. Another pilot study asked participants to take on the role of the other person present in the allocation decision along with information about their bonus preference and if they would tell the other managers about the total pool of funds. The information from the pilot studies will determine whether or not your allocation is accepted. You will <u>only</u> receive a bonus if your allocation is accepted based on the findings of the pilot studies. In other words, the pilot

studies will set a minimum threshold for what the "other manager" will accept. As long as you do not exceed the minimum threshold, you will receive a bonus based on the amount that you allotted to yourself.

Allocation Instructions

In the space below, please report how you would allocate the $100,000 between yourself and the other manager. You must make sure that the total allocation between the two of you equals $100,000.

Yourself _____

Other Manager _____

What would you tell the other manager regarding the total size of the bonus funds available? You can convey any amount here.

Other Manager _____

APPENDIX B

PILOT 1 — RECIPIENT INSTRUCTIONS

Role Instructions

Imagine that you are a manager at a Fortune 500 company. Another manager has been asked to allocate a bonus between them and you. As you are currently unaware of the total amount of money to be allocated, you must rely on the allocating manager to know both the total amount of bonus money and how much money was allocated to each of you.

You get no say in the bonus allocation, but if you choose to reject the bonus allocation for any reason, neither of you receive a bonus at this time.

Your role in this survey is to determine when you might reject the allocation of the bonus money

APPENDIX C

PILOT 2 — SALIENT OTHER INSTRUCTIONS

Role Instructions

Imagine that you work at a Fortune 500 company. A manager has been asked to allocate an $100,000 bonus between them and another manager. The other manager is currently unaware of the total amount of money to be allocated so the allocating manager will have the opportunity to communicate both the total amount of bonus money and how much money was allocated to each of them.

You have been assigned to help with the logistics of the allocation decision, but the allocating manager gets final say over the allocation decision. You have limited input, but the other manager did an unrelated personal favor for you and you have expressed to the allocating manager that you would appreciate it if they would give the other manager a little extra bonus money.

The other manager gets no say in the bonus allocation, but if the other manager chooses to reject the allocation for any reason, neither receives a bonus at this time.

APPENDIX D

STUDY 2A - INSTRUCTIONS

General Instructions

Please read the following scenario and then engage in a brief decision-making exercise. Read the scenario carefully because you may receive a monetary bonus depending on your performance in addition to your base compensation for this study.

Conditions (wording differences across conditions are indicated by italics)

Imagine that you are a manager at a Fortune 500 company. You have been asked to allocate an $100,000 bonus between yourself and another manager. As the other manager is currently unaware of the total amount of money to be allocated, you will have the opportunity to communicate both the total amount of bonus money and how much money was allocated to both yourself (Allocator) and the other manager (Recipient).

One of your *more / less* influential and *highly / lesser* paid subordinates (SS1) at work has been assigned to help you with the logistics, but you get final say over the allocation decision. *During the allocation decisions, your subordinate has stated that they would appreciate it if more money were allotted to the other manager (Recipient). / (no additional information given).* Your subordinate has limited additional input regarding

the actual allocation decision. The other manager gets no say in the bonus allocation, but if the other manager chooses to reject your allocation for any reason, neither of you receive a bonus at this time.

Additional Instructions

A pilot study has been conducted that asked participants to imagine that they were the other manager in the above scenario. In the pilot study, participants were given information about different allocations and different total bonus allocation amounts. Another pilot study asked participants to take on the role of the other person present in the allocation decision along with information about their bonus preference and if they would tell the other managers about the total pool of funds. The information from the pilot studies will determine whether or not your allocation is accepted. You will only receive a bonus if your allocation is accepted based on the findings of the pilot studies. In other words, the pilot studies will set a minimum threshold for what the "other manager" will accept. As long as you do not exceed the minimum threshold, you will receive a bonus based on the amount that you allotted to yourself.

Allocation Instructions

In the space below, please report how you would allocate the $100,000 between yourself and the other manager. You must make sure that the total allocation between the two of you equals $100,000.

Yourself _____

Other Manager _____

What would you tell the other manager regarding the total size of the bonus funds available? You can convey any amount here.

Other Manager _____

APPENDIX E

STUDY 2B – INSTRUCTIONS

General Instructions

Please read the following scenario and then engage in a brief decision making exercise. Read the scenario carefully because you may receive a monetary bonus depending on your performance in addition to your base compensation for this study.

Conditions (wording differences across conditions are indicated by italics)

Imagine that you are a manager at a Fortune 500 company. You have been asked to allocate a $100,000 bonus between yourself and two other managers. As the other managers are currently unaware of the total amount of money to be allocated, you will have the opportunity to communicate both the total amount of bonus money and how much money was allocated to both yourself (Allocator) and the two other managers (Recipient1 and Recipient2).

One of your *more / less* influential and *higher / lesser* paid subordinates (S1) at work has been assigned to help you with the logistics, but you get final say over the allocation decision. *During the allocation decision, your subordinate has stated that they would appreciate it if more money were allotted to the first of the two other*

managers (Recipient1) / (no additional information given). Your subordinate has limited additional input regarding the actual allocation decision.

Neither of the other managers get a say in the bonus allocation, but if either of the other managers chooses to reject your allocation for any reason, none of you receive a bonus at this time.

Additional Instructions

A pilot study has been conducted that asked participants to imagine that they were the other managers in the above scenario. In the pilot study, participants were given information about different allocations and different total bonus allocation amounts. Another pilot study asked participants to take on the role of the other person present in the allocation decision along with information about their bonus preference and if they would tell the other managers about the total pool of funds. The information from the pilot studies will determine whether or not your allocation is accepted. You will only receive a bonus if your allocation is accepted based on the findings of the pilot studies. In other words, the pilot studies will set a minimum threshold for what the "other managers" will accept. As long as you do not exceed the minimum threshold, you will receive a bonus based on the amount that you allotted to yourself.

Allocation Instructions

In the space below, please report how you would allocate the $100,000 between yourself and the two other managers. You must make sure that the total allocation between the three of you equals $100,000.

Yourself _____

Other Manager 1 (Recipient1) _____

Other Manager 2 (Recipient2) _____

What would you tell each of the other managers regarding the total size of the bonus funds available? You can convey any amount here.

Other Manager 1 (Recipient1) _____

Other Manager 2 (Recipient2) _____

APPENDIX F

PILOT 3 — 2 RECIPIENTS INSTRUCTIONS

Role Instructions

Imagine that you are a manager at a Fortune 500 company. Another manager has been asked to allocate a bonus between them, you, and another manager. As you are currently unaware of the total amount of money to be allocated, you must rely on the allocating manager to know both the total amount of bonus money and how much money was allocated to each of you.

You get no say in the bonus allocation, but if you choose to reject the bonus allocation for any reason, none of you receive a bonus at this time.

Your role in this survey is to determine when you might reject the allocation of funds.

APPENDIX G

STUDY 3 – INSTRUCTIONS

General Instructions

Please read the following scenario and then answer questions regarding the scenario. Please read the scenario carefully.

Conditions (wording differences across conditions are indicated by italics)

Imagine that you are a manager at a Fortune 500 company. Your boss has asked you to allocate a $100,000 bonus. Your direct subordinate at work will help you with the decision, but you will ultimately get the final say over the allocation decision. This task *has complex considerations / is simple and straightforward* and thus *requires / does not require* strong leadership. You have been selected for this task *because of your strong ability to effectively manage your team / despite your lack of any particular abilities to effectively manage your team.*

APPENDIX H

11-ITEM MEASURE OF MANAGERIAL SELF-EFFICACY

(ROBERTSON & SADRI, 1993)

When making your best effort, would you be able to

1) Schedule work for your subordinates?
2) Orientate new employees?
3) Resolve conflicts among subordinates?
4) Negotiate with others in order to reach an agreement or solution?
5) Make decisions on simple problems without prior approval of superiors?
6) Make decisions on complex problems without prior approval of superiors?
7) Plan for implementation of new contracts, policies, and procedures?
8) Prepare or supervise the preparation of objectives and goals for your unit?
9) Set priorities for work assigned to various work units?
10) Measure the performance of others?
11) Develop and control governance procedures?

Note: Responses ranged from 1 (almost always untrue) to 5 (almost always true).

APPENDIX I

13-ITEM ADAPTED MEASURE OF SUBSTITUTES FOR LEADERSHIP

(PODSAKOFF & MACKENZIE, 1993)

Please rate the truthfulness of the following statements:

1) [My subordinates] have the competence to act independently in performing my day-to-day duties.
2) [My subordinates] should need to receive very useful information and guidance from people who share their occupational specialty, but who are not members of my organization.
3) In general, most of the things [my subordinates] seek and value in this world cannot be obtained from [their] job or employing organization.
4) Because of the nature of the task performed, there is little doubt about the best way to get the work done.
5) [My subordinates] jobs are the kind where you can make a mistake or an error and not be able to see that you've made it. (R)
6) [My subordinates] get a great deal of personal satisfaction from the work [they] do.
7) My [subordinates'] job responsibilities are clearly specified.
8) [My subordinates] should consider the rules and policies as general guidelines, not as rigid and unbending. (R)
9) [My subordinates] receive very useful information and guidance from staff personnel who are based outside their work unit or department.
10) My subordinates' job satisfaction depends to a considerable extent on members of their work group other than me.
11) The only performance feedback that matters to [my subordinates] is that given me by me. (R)
12) The nature of [my subordinates'] jobs are such that [I] seldom would need to be

around when [they] are working.

13) [My subordinates] like it when [I tell them] what to do. (R)

Note: Responses ranged from 1 (almost always untrue) to (5) almost always true. (R) indicates reversed item.

APPENDIX J

7-ITEM ADAPTED MEASURE OF SUBSTITUTES FOR LEADERSHIP

(KERR & JERMIER, 1978)

Based on the information available in this scenario, please answer the following questions:

1) [Because of the nature of this task], there would be little doubt about the best way to get the work done.
2) [Because of the nature of the allocation], nonroutine tasks would be required.
3) [Because of the nature of this task], one could predict with near certainty the activities that need to be performed.
4) There is probably only one correct way to perform [this] task.
5) [The] task is so simple that almost anyone could perform the task after a little bit of instruction and experience.
6) It would be difficult to figure out the best approach to perform [this] task (R).
7) There would be a great deal of "second-guessing while performing [the] task (R).

Note: Responses ranged from 1 (almost always untrue) to (5) almost always true. (R) indicates reversed item.

APPENDIX K

STUDY 4 – INSTRUCTIONS

General Instructions

Please read the following scenario and then engage in a brief decision-making exercise. Read the scenario carefully because you may receive a monetary bonus depending on your performance in addition to your base compensation for this study.

Conditions (wording differences across conditions are indicated by italics)

Imagine that you are a manager at a Fortune 500 company. You have been asked to allocate a $100,000 bonus between yourself and two other managers. As the other managers are currently unaware of the total amount of money to be allocated, you will have the opportunity to communicate both the total amount of bonus money and how much money was allocated to both yourself (Allocator) and the two other managers (Recipient1 and Recipient2).

One of your subordinates (S1) at work has been assigned to help you with the logistics, but you get final say over the allocation decision. *This task has complex considerations and thus requires strong leadership. You have been selected for this task because of your strong leadership abilities. / This task is simple and straightforward and*

does not requires strong leadership. You have been selected for this task despite your lack of any particular abilities to effectively manage your team. During the allocation decision, your subordinate has stated that they would appreciate it if more money were allotted to the first of the two other managers (Recipient1). Your subordinate has limited additional input regarding the actual allocation decision.

Neither of the other managers get a say in the bonus allocation, but if either of the other managers chooses to reject your allocation for any reason, none of you receive a bonus at this time.

Additional Instructions

A pilot study has been conducted that asked participants to imagine that they were the other managers in the above scenario. In the pilot study, participants were given information about different allocations and different total bonus allocation amounts. Another pilot study asked participants to take on the role of the other person present in the allocation decision along with information about their bonus preference and if they would tell the other managers about the total pool of funds. The information from the pilot studies will determine whether or not your allocation is accepted. You will only receive a bonus if your allocation is accepted based on the findings of the pilot studies. In other words, the pilot studies will set a minimum threshold for what the "other managers" will accept. As long as you do not exceed the minimum threshold, you will receive a bonus based on the amount that you allotted to yourself.

Allocation Instructions

In the space below, please report how you would allocate the $100,000 between yourself and the two other managers. You must make sure that the total allocation between the three of you equals $100,000.

Yourself _____

Other Manager 1 (Recipient1) _____

Other Manager 2 (Recipient2) _____

What would you tell each of the other managers regarding the total size of the bonus funds available? You can convey any amount here.

Other Manager 1 (Recipient1) _____

Other Manager 2 (Recipient2) _____

APPENDIX L

STUDY 5 – INSTRUCTIONS

General Instructions

Please read the following scenario and then engage in a brief decision-making exercise. Read the scenario carefully because you may receive a monetary bonus depending on your performance in addition to your base compensation for this study.

Conditions (wording differences across conditions are indicated by italics)

Imagine that you are a manager at a Fortune 500 company. You have been asked to allocate a $100,000 bonus between yourself and two other managers. As the other managers are currently unaware of the total amount of money to be allocated, you will have the opportunity to communicate both the total amount of bonus money and how much money was allocated to both yourself (Allocator) and the two other managers (Recipient1 and Recipient2).

One of your *higher / lesser* paid and *more / less* influential subordinates (S1) at work has been assigned to help you with the logistics, but you get final say over the allocation decision. *This task has complex considerations and thus requires strong leadership. You have been selected for this task because of your strong leadership abilities. / This task is*

simple and straightforward and does not require strong leadership. You have been selected for this task despite your lack of any particular abilities to effectively manage your team. During the allocation decision, your subordinate has stated that they would appreciate it if more money were allotted to the first of the two other managers (Recipient1). Your subordinate has limited additional input regarding the actual allocation decision.

Neither of the other managers get a say in the bonus allocation, but if either of the other managers chooses to reject your allocation for any reason, none of you receive a bonus at this time.

Additional Instructions

A pilot study has been conducted that asked participants to imagine that they were the other managers in the above scenario. In the pilot study, participants were given information about different allocations and different total bonus allocation amounts. Another pilot study asked participants to take on the role of the other person present in the allocation decision along with information about their bonus preference and if they would tell the other managers about the total pool of funds. The information from the pilot studies will determine whether or not your allocation is accepted. You will only receive a bonus if your allocation is accepted based on the findings of the pilot studies. In other words, the pilot studies will set a minimum threshold for what the "other managers" will accept. As long as you do not exceed the minimum threshold, you will receive a bonus based on the amount that you allotted to yourself.

Allocation Instructions

In the space below, please report how you would allocate the $100,000 between yourself and the two other managers. You must make sure that the total allocation between the three of you equals $100,000.

Yourself _____

Other Manager 1 (Recipient1) _____

Other Manager 2 (Recipient2) _____

What would you tell each of the other managers regarding the total size of the bonus funds available? You can convey any amount here.

Other Manager 1 (Recipient1) _____

Other Manager 2 (Recipient2) _____

APPENDIX M

STUDY 6 – INSTRUCTIONS

General Instructions

After answering the question below, this survey will ask you to recall an individual you have worked with in the past and then respond to questions regarding a scenario involving that individual. Please answer the questions to the best of your ability.

In your previous or current work experience, have you ever held a formal leadership role (e.g., manager, supervisor, team lead, etc.)?

Conditions (Below are the conditions for those with previous leadership experience. Wording differences across conditions are indicated by italics)

Please think of a *higher /lesser* paid and *more / less* influential subordinates from your previous or current work experience. Now think of a task from your previous or current work experience where there was/is a *great need / little need* for you to actively manage your subordinates.

You will now be asked a series of questions regarding this individual and task.

In one sentence each, please honestly respond to the following questions regarding the subordinate and task that came to mind.

(1) How would you respond if this employee told you that they would like to

perform this task differently then you have instructed them?

(2) How would you respond if the employee asked you to radically change the way the task is performed even if you see little value in the request?

(3) How would you respond if the employee asked you to radically change the way the task is performed assuming the task would be performed more efficiently but it might reflect negatively on you?

(4) How would you respond if the employee asked you to radically change the way the task is performed assuming the task would be performed less efficiently but it might reflect positively on you?

(5) If your boss approached you and commended you on your work on this task, how likely would you be to pass the credit on to this employee?

Now imagine that you are a manager at a Fortune 500 company. You have been asked to allocate a $100,000 bonus between yourself and another manager. As the other manager is currently unaware of the total amount of money to be allocated, you will have the opportunity to communicate both the total amount of bonus money and how much money was allocated to both yourself (Allocator) and the other manager (Recipient).

Imagine that your subordinate from the previous scenario has been assigned to help you with the logistics of the allocation, but you get final say over the allocation decision. *This task has complex considerations and thus requires strong leadership. You have been selected for this task because of your strong leadership abilities. / This task is simple and straightforward and thus does not require strong leadership. You have been selected for this task despite your lack of leadership abilities.* Your subordinate has limited additional input regarding the actual allocation decision.

The other manager (Recipient) gets no say in the bonus allocation, but if the other manager chooses to reject the allocation for any reason, neither of you receives a bonus at this time.

Allocation Instructions

In the space below, please report how you would allocate the $100,000 between yourself and the other manager. You must make sure that the total allocation between the two of you equals $100,000.

Yourself _____

Other Manager _____

What would you tell the other manager regarding the total size of the bonus funds available? You can convey any amount here.

Other Manager _____

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